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ABSTRACT 
Since the declaration of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, men and women have been 
recruited to join the Caliphate in numbers surpassing those recruited by al Qaida. This 
variance in recruitment volume is likely attributable to the online propaganda campaign, 
Brand Caliphate. This thesis looks at the recruitment of women and asks if Brand 
Caliphate specifically targets females with its messaging, and if so, is the messaging 
effective? 
Based on a textual analysis of Brand Caliphate’s propaganda, it appears IS tried to 
deliver messaging targeted toward females. However, six case studies of radicalized 
females suggests the recruitment of these women does not appear to be directly 
attributable to the targeted messaging. There is, however, evidence that most of the 
female recruitment studied linked to online radicalization and Brand Caliphate’s broader 
messaging.  
All of the women studied did initially look online for information regarding IS. 
This initial outreach served to identify them as targets for radicalization by IS recruiters, 
who continued to persuade the females through direct online communication. Ultimately, 
a sense of belonging to a community, even if it exists online, served as a more powerful 
draw to potential recruits than the targeted messaging of Brand Caliphate. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Abayas/Aba An Arabic term for a loose, cloak-like garment or cover worn by 
Muslim women; similar to a burqa 
Al-Hayat Media 
Center The foreign language media center of IS 
Al-Khansaa Brigade The all-female police force/religious enforcement used to patrol 
women living in the Caliphate 
Brand Caliphate The extensive media and propaganda marketing conducted by IS 
Burqa/Burka An Urdu term for a loose, cloak-like garment or cover worn by 
Muslim women; similar to Abayas 
Caliph The leader of the Muslim community, or Caliphate and successor 
to the prophet Muhammad 
Caliphate The area under control by the Caliph 
Dabiq The highly stylized propaganda magazine published by IS 
Dawlah A reference to the state or government; the Caliphate 
Deen An individual’s religion 
Dua Prayer; act of supplication 
Fitrah Instinct; common sense within Islam 
Hadith A recording of the words and actions of Muhammad 
Hijab A veil that covers the head and chest worn by some Muslim 
women in public or around non-mahram men 
Hijrah Jihad by immigration, based on the historic flight of Muhammad 
from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution 
In Group The social identity theory process of categorizing people as 
belonging to a group of “us” or “them”; the “in” Group is 
perceived to experience preferential treatment by others in the 
same group, known as the in-group bias 
IS, ISIS, ISIL or 
Daesh Interchangeable titles used to refer to the Islamic State 
Jihad The religious duty of Muslims to maintain the religion; the act of 
striving; the physical war against unbelievers 
Koran/Quran The central religious text of Islam 
Kafir/Kuffir/Kufr An unbeliever; someone who does not believe Muhammad is the 
final messenger and rejects Allah (slang “kuffs”) 
 xii 
Mahram A Muslim male who is an unmarriageable kin to a female Muslim; 
a female Muslim may be publicly escorted by her mahram or 
remove her hijab in his presence 
Muhajirah One who has made the hijrah or journey to the Caliphate 
Mujahideen Plural for mujahid; a group of individuals engaged in waging jihad 
Niqab A cloth that covers the face, except for the eyes, worn by some 
Muslim women in public or around men non-mahram men; part of 
the hijab 
Shahada The first of the five pillars of Islam; the testimony or declaration of 
faith that there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the 
messenger of Allah 
Sharia/Shariah Law Islamic law derived from Muhammad via the Sunnah and Quran; 
regulates public behavior, private behavior, and private beliefs 
Shirk The sin of polytheism, or worshiping anything other than Allah 
(god) 
Sunnah/Sunna The tradition of Islamic law, based on the verbal transmissions of 
the words and behavior of Muhammad 
Takfiri The act of a Sunni Muslim accusing another Muslim of apostasy 
Takfiri doctrine The reasoning used to justify violence against non-Muslims to 
purify the world of unbelievers 





Within a short period of time, the terrorist organization the Islamic State (IS), also 
referred to as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh, has arguably surpassed al Qaida (AQ) as the 
number-one terrorist threat to U.S. interests, and has been firmly implanted in the U.S. 
vernacular. As early as January 2015, 70 percent of Americans identified IS as the 
biggest challenge facing the United States in the Middle East, and the topic of U.S. policy 
toward IS has been prevalent in the 2016 presidential elections campaigns. 
The Islamic State, originally known as Al Qaida in Iraq, broke allegiance from 
AQ after the death of Osama bin Laden; however, it continued to follow the AQ 
recruitment doctrine. Reporting from individual recruits indicates IS uses many of the 
techniques authored and practiced by AQ in its manual A Course in the Art of Recruiting. 
However, AQ recruitment numbers look stark when compared to those of IS. As of 
September 2015, approximately 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to fight in Syria or 
Iraq, a number that tripled in less than a year. United States Government officials 
continue to estimate the IS fighting force at 20,000–30,000 despite losses from airstrikes 
estimated at over 10,000, as well as deaths from its ground war offensive. 
The foreign fighter surge is not limited to men, with steady stories in the media of 
young women deserting their families to join IS. Although overall numbers for female 
recruits are uncertain, within the United States, there have been 66 arrests of IS 
supporters between January 2014 and September 2015. Ten of those arrests were women. 
Those cases only represent the number of potential female recruits in which law 
enforcement intervention resulted in an arrest. The numbers to do not reflect intervention 
not resulting in arrest or cases where the female was successfully recruited. 
How is IS achieving success beyond that of AQ in their recruitment of foreign 
fighters when they are using the same recruitment manual? The most obvious distinction 
is the prominent use by IS of the internet and social media specifically. IS has infiltrated 
the internet, exploiting the technology to spread their message and reach out to those 
susceptible to radicalization. Sasha Havlicek, director of the think tank Institute for 
 xiv 
Strategic Dialogue, has coined the phrase “Brand Caliphate” in reference to the IS online 
marketing machine. 
In conducting a textual analysis of the messaging being disseminated by, or on 
behalf of, the official IS media wing al-Hayat Media Center, it can be argued that IS has 
developed targeted messaging toward the genders. Evidence exists to indicate Brand 
Caliphate attempts to tailor the messaging to appeal to the intended audience, with 
propaganda varying from gruesome calls to jihad for potential male recruits, to calls to 
join the sisterhood and raise little Islamic Cubs under the protection of the Caliphate 
geared toward potential female recruits. 
A subsequent study of six cases of recruited, or near-recruited, females 
surprisingly offered no indication that their radicalization was affected by Brand 
Caliphate’s targeted messaging. In fact, no evidence could be discovered to indicate the 
women were ever even exposed to the specific propaganda. However, the females 
examined in the case studies did appear to be affected by the overall marketing of Brand 
Caliphate, with emphasis on the trendy, jihadi cool status IS has worked to cultivate. 
Some of the women even showed a positive response to the more traditional male-
targeted propaganda. The singular trend that did emerge is despite what peaked the initial 
interest of the female recruit, ultimately their radicalization was more influenced by the 
interpersonal communication between the potential recruit and an IS recruiter, despite the 
fact all of the communication occurred in an online environment. Additionally, the 
recruits seemed to express a sense of isolation, self-imposed or otherwise, which was 
alleviated by a sense of belonging to IS. 
Consequently, there is evidence to indicate that although there is targeted 
messaging by Brand Caliphate toward the genders, the broader narrative of Brand 
Caliphate as being “cool” resonates more with potential recruits. Further, the branding of 
IS is key for a potential recruit to take the initial steps toward radicalization; however, 
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ISIL blends traditional media platforms, glossy photos, in-depth articles, 
and social media campaigns that can go viral in a matter of seconds…No 
matter the format, the message of radicalization spreads faster than we 
imagined just a few years ago. Social media has allowed groups, such as 
ISIL, to use the internet to spot and assess potential recruits. With the 
widespread horizontal distribution of social media, terrorists can identify 
vulnerable individuals of all ages in the United States—spot, assess, 
recruit and radicalize…Your grandfather’s al Qaeda, if you wanted to get 
propaganda, you had to go find it. Find where Inspire magazine was and 
read it. If you want to talk to a terrorist, you had to send an email into 
Inspire magazine and hope that Anwar al Awlaki would email you back. 
Now all that’s in your pocket. All that propaganda is in your pocket, and 
the terrorist is in your pocket. You can have direct communication with a 
terrorist in Syria all day and night, and so the effect of that—especially on 
troubled minds and kids—it works! It’s buzz, buzz, buzz, buzz, buzz. It’s 
the constant feed, the constant touching, so it’s very, very different and 
much more effective at radicalizing than your grandfather’s al Qaeda 
model. 
 —FBI Director James Comey 
July 2015 Congressional Testimony1 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
How has the Islamic State’s (IS) online marketing and establishment of “Brand 
Caliphate” affected the radicalization and recruitment between the genders? Is there 
messaging from Brand Caliphate that targets and/or appeals to women as opposed to 
men, and if so, has that affected the number of women who have been recruited to join 
IS? 
In this thesis, I analyze the online marketing of the Islamic State through the use 
of textual analysis of its propaganda. The focus of this assessment is on targeted 
messaging toward each gender and the effect of Brand Caliphate on the radicalization and 
                                                 
1 Threats to the Homeland. United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. October 8, 2015. Washington, DC (statement of James Comey, 
 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/threats-to-the-
homeland2015. 
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recruitment between the genders. I study six cases of women who were recruited, or near 
recruited, to IS to determine if targeted messaging toward women does exist, and if so, 
did it influence their radicalization. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Within a short period of time, the terrorist organization the IS, also referred to as 
ISIS and ISIL, has arguably surpassed AQ as the number-one terrorist threat to U.S. 
interests, and has been firmly implanted in the U.S. vernacular. As early as January 2015, 
70 percent of Americans identified IS as the biggest challenge facing the United States in 
the Middle East,2 and the topic of U.S. policy toward IS has been prevalent in the 2016 
presidential election campaigns.  
The Islamic State, originally known as Al Qaida in Iraq, broke allegiance from 
AQ after the death of Osama bin Laden; however, it continued to follow the AQ 
recruitment doctrine. Anecdotal stories of individual recruits indicate IS uses many of the 
techniques authored and practiced by AQ in its manual A Course in the Art of 
Recruiting.34 AQ recruitment numbers from inception in 1988 through July 2015 are 
estimated to be in “the low thousands.”5 These recruits are believed to be mostly men, 
reflected in an April 2008 audio recording of AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stating that a 
woman’s role is limited to caring for the homes and the children of AQ fighters.6  
AQ recruitment numbers look stark when compared to those of IS. As of 
September 2015, approximately 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to fight in Syria or 
                                                 
2 Shibley Telhami, “America Public Attitudes Toward ISIS and Syria,” Brookings Institute, January 8, 
2105, https://www.brookings.edu/research/american-public-attitudes-toward-isis-and-syria/. 
3 “A Course in the Art of Recruiting,” accessed October 25, 2015, https://ia800300.us.archive.org/32/
items/ACourseInTheArtOfRecruiting-RevisedJuly2010/A_Course_in_the_Art_of_Recruiting_-
_Revised_July2010.pdf. 
4 Pamela Engel, “Here’s the Manual That Al Qaeda and Now ISIS Use to Brainwash People Online,” 
Business Insider, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-manual-al-qaeda-and-now-
isis-use-to-brainwash-people-online-2015-7. 
5 Daniel L. Byman, “Al Qaeda’s Growth and Recruitment Strategy,” Brookings Institute, December 7, 
2010, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/07-al-qaeda-byman.  
6 Associated Press, “Al Qaeda to Muslim Extremist Women: Stay Home, Raise Kids,” Fox News. 
May 31, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/05/31/al-qaeda-to-muslim-extremist-women-stay-
home-raise-kids.html. 
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Iraq, a number that tripled in less than a year.7 Although it is not possible to tell how 
many of those individuals traveled to fight for IS versus other active groups in the area 
(pro-Syrian, al Nusra Front, etc.), United States government officials continue to estimate 
its fighting force as steady at 20,000–30,000 despite losses from airstrikes estimated at 
over 10,000, as well as deaths from its ground war offensive.8  
The foreign fighter surge is not limited to men, with a number of stories in the 
media of young women deserting their families to join IS. Although overall numbers for 
female recruits seem amorphous, the Saudi Ministry of Interior reported at least 46 Saudi 
women traveled to Syria between 2011 and September 2015.9 The Obama administration 
estimates the volume of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria as approximately 
1,000 per month, with more than half of the U.S. recruits believed to be under age 25.10 
Within the United States, there have been 66 arrests of IS supporters between January 
2014 and September 2015—10 of those arrests were women.11 
How is IS achieving success beyond that of AQ in their recruitment of foreign 
fighters when they are using the same recruitment manual? The most obvious distinction 
is the prominent use by IS of the internet and social media specific ally. IS has infiltrated 
the internet, exploiting the technology to spread their message and reach out to those 
susceptible to radicalization. Sasha Havlicek, director of the think tank Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, has coined the phrase “Brand Caliphate”12 in reference to the IS 
                                                 
7John Katko et al., “Final Report of the Task Force On Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter 
Travel,” Congressional, September 2015, 12. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “More than Forty Saudi Women Have Joined ISIS in Syria,” ARA News, accessed October 25, 2015, 
http://aranews.net/2015/09/more-than-forty-saudi-women-have-joined-isis-in-syria/.  
10 Kimberly Dozier, “Generation ISIS The Western Millennials Stocking the Terror Army: Obama 
Officials Acknowledge That 1,000 Foreign Fighters a Month Are Still Traveling to Iraq and Syria—and 
More Than 50 Percent of U.S. Recruits Are under the Age of 25,” Daily Beast, September 28, 2015, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/28/generation-isis-the-western-millennials-stocking-the-
terror-army.html. 
11 Katie Zavadski, “The United States of ISIS: More Popular Than Al Qaeda Ever Was,” Daily Beast, 
September 11, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/11/the-united-states-of-isis.html.  
12 Katrin Bennhold, “Britain Is Losing Against ISIS Recruitment Tactics,” New York Times, July 29, 
2015.  
4 
online marketing machine. How this internet-based marketing strategy and propaganda 
onslaught is effected between the genders remains unclear and requires exploration. 
1. Atmospherics—The Internet as a Propaganda Tool
A significant amount of research and publications exist examining the evolution 
of terrorism with the advent of the internet. In a study conducted by the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy in January 2013, Zelin and Fellow13 define the four phases 
of the evolution of jihadi media. Phase 1 began in 1984 with traditional hardcopy print 
media, sermons, and videotapes. This evolved into phase 2 in the mid-1990s, with the 
establishment of top-down, or domain-based, websites, run by jihadi organizations. In the 
mid-2000s, this transitioned to phase 3 and the use of interactive forums. By the end of 
the 2000s this ultimately led to phase 4 and the use of social media platforms. The 
emergence of social media, also referred to as Web 2.0 applications, has created new 
opportunities for creating online communities, uniting like-minded users and sharing 
content.14 Zelin and Fellow find a correlation between each stage of this evolution, and 
the adoption of a new medium for the distribution of information. This evolution was 
seen by Noguchi and Kholmann, who assert in a 2006 report that they found “90 percent 
of terrorist activity on the internet takes place using social networking tools.”15 For the 
purpose of their assessment, they define terrorist activity as researching and coordinating 
attacks, global expansion of their propaganda, recruitment communicating with 
supporters and sympathizers, and fund-raising. 
In a trend that defies Coopers law by exhibiting exponential growth,16 between 
2000 and 2011, internet connectivity in the Middle East grew by approximately 2000 
percent, compared with a worldwide growth during the same period of 480 percent. In 
13 Aaron Zelin and Richard Borow Fellow, “The State of Global Jihad Online,” Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy (January 2013):4. 
14 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Jack Newman, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review of Online 
Terrorism,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3, no. 3 (2012): 107.  
15 Gabriel Weimann, “Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 16 
(2009): 46. 
16 Coopers law states that the improving ability of wireless networks to utilize spectrum and transmit 
information doubles every 2.5 years. Richard Bennett, “The Growing Demand for Spectrum,” High Tech 
Forum, accessed July 6, 2015, http://hightechforum.org/the-growing-demand-for-spectrum/.  
5 
Pakistan alone, this number skyrocketed 15,000 percent for the same date range.17 
Although most technologically savvy Middle Easterners have nothing to do with Islamic 
extremism, the misnomer of the jihadist as an archaic entity, eschewing a modern world, 
is an inaccurate depiction of the state of affairs. As Dr. Manuel R. Torres Soriano, 
professor of foreign policy and conflict processes at the University of Pablo de Olavide 
en Sevilla, pointed out: 
Muslims are obliged not only to wage the jihad against the enemies of 
Islam by taking up the sword (carrying out acts of violence) but also by 
using the pen (through communication and propaganda). This notion has 
found increasing favour in terrorist narrative in tandem with the spread of 
new information technologies, particularly the internet.18 
This concept of waging online jihad is mirrored by Ashlee Woods, who similarly 
states, “The War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been 
both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas…The War on Terrorism is both a conventional 
arms war and a transnational ideological movement.”19 The internet has provided a free, 
easily accessible, and widely available medium to facilitate implementation of this 
movement. 
2. The Knowledge Gap—Consensus and Debate
Experts agree that the internet provides unique opportunities for terrorist 
organizations. The ease and anonymity provided through an online medium assists with 
recruitment, fund-raising, propaganda, internal communications, and training.20 There 
has been a lack of discussion and evidence of IS specifically or successfully using the 
17 John Curtis Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 35, no. 5 (May 2012): 341, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2012.666819. 
18 Manuel R. Torres Soriano, “Between the Pen and the Sword: The Global Islamic Media Front in the 
West,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 5 (November 2012): 769, doi:10.1080/
09546553.2011.643934. 
19 Ashlee Woods, “Terrorists and the internet,” NATO Security through Science Series E Human and 
Societal Dynamics 22 (2007): 271. 
20 Catherine A. Theohary et al., Terrorist Use of the internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace 






internet as a fund-raising tool. In fact, IS has managed to become one of the richest 
terrorist organizations in history without having to solicit funds, instead financing their 
campaign through a combination of seized funds from the Bank of Iraq, oil production on 
seized lands, and various criminal activities, including credit card fraud, hostage 
ransoming, extortion, and sales of stolen antiquities.21 Instead, the internet is where IS 
has demonstrated proficiency, using online resources and social media sites in particular 
in its recruitment and propaganda toward the genders. Woods explains the process in 
which terrorist groups accomplish this online: 
Typical extremist websites’ propaganda packages include articles 
condemning the West, biographies of terrorists killed in battle [or as 
suicide bombers], biased accounts of the current war, and religious 
justification for the activities, transcripts of speeches, songs celebrating 
jihad, public statements from the group, and motivational films [often 
beheadings, war tapes, bomb detonations, etc…]. Terrorist organizations 
prey upon and advertise to disenfranchised youth globally by offering a 
“community-environment” in which recruits can become part of a larger 
ideological movement. The internet environment facilitates this 
community feeling and terrorist organizations intentionally use technology 
to create a sense of global connectedness.22 
Noted forensic psychologist and terrorism expert Marc Sageman is frequently 
quoted as having stated, “the internet is now the place disenfranchised youth go to get 
radicalized instead of the mosque…[terrorists] don’t even need the mosque now.”23 
However, David Tucker, former professor in the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
Department of Defense Analysis, challenges this point. Not only does Tucker call into 
question Sageman’s lack of supporting documentation, he also provides an interesting 
counterpoint, arguing that the internet has played a role in recruitment and propaganda 
for terrorist groups, but this has not replaced offline, face-to-face communications and is 
21 Ashley Fantz, “How ISIS Makes (and Takes) Money,” CNN, accessed June 18, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/world/how-isis-makes-money/index.html. 
22 Woods, “Terrorists and the internet.” 272–273. 
23 Ibid. 273. 
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not as revolutionary as Sageman claims.24 In light of the findings detailed in the 
conclusion of this thesis, Tucker’s argument is almost prescient, touching on the 
importance of interpersonal communication in the radicalization process. 
In a June 2015 article in the Guardian, Servin and Vamos echoed Tucker’s 
assertion, stating, “No amount of clicking can ever substitute for showing up at a 
place.”25 Woods take a different stance, describing the terrorist use of the internet as an 
innovative resource for researching possible targets: 
Deemed a vast digital library, the internet offers valuable information to 
terrorist organizations. Critical information pertaining to important 
facilities and networks is available on the internet. Any person, terrorist or 
otherwise, can freely roam the internet and gain access to such information 
as maps, diagrams, and operations.26 
What is the motivation for IS to change the recruitment paradigm and attract 
significant numbers of women to the cause? Veryan Khan, editorial director of the 
Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium advises 
there’s a priority for the Islamic State to attract females because it offers 
stability. If you want people to see you as a nation, a legitimate state, it’s 
important to attract females and have them start families. It’s not like 
women are an afterthought. This is a strategic move.27 
Through the following textual analysis of the propaganda marketed by Brand 
Caliphate, an attempt will be made to determine if there is in fact targeted messaging and 
propaganda aimed at women for the purpose of recruitment. Additionally, through an 
examination of several case studies, an effort will be made to determine if this targeted 
24 David Tucker, “Jihad Dramatically Transformed? Sageman on Jihad and the internet,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 6, no.1 (January 2010): http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25056, 5. Tucker states: 
“Internet images sometimes appear to assist if not initiate the movement to extremism. Chat rooms play a 
role but rarely are the place terrorists first meet; face-to-face contact predominates. Mosques and other 
physical gathering places figure more prominently than the internet…the internet appears to be a useful but 
by no means a transforming or even dominant means of mobilizing recruits for extremism.”  
25 The Yes Men via Creative Time Reports, “Technology Supports Movements. But Only Risk-Takers 
Make Political Change | The Yes Men,” Guardian, accessed June 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/jun/12/technology-political-movements-risk-taking-change. 
26 Woods, “Terrorists and the internet.” 274. 
27 Kate Storey, “The American Women of ISIS,” Marie Claire, April 22, 2016, 
http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a20011/western-women-who-join-isis/. 
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A. THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The Islamic State, emerging from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Qaida in Iraq , has 
evolved and established its own identity in the last 11 years. The history of Zarqawi and 
his relationship with first al Qaida (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden, and following his 
death, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is well documented in numerous publications. Many of these 
take a fact-based approach to recording the history of these relationships and their effect 
on the split of the two groups, while others are more thoughtful in the nuances of these 
relationships. In particular, Mary Anne Weaver’s 2006 article, “The Short, Violent Life 
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” published in the Atlantic,28 verges on a social identity theory 
foundation to understanding the distinction between IS and AQ. Once this dynamic and 
interplay of personalities is understood, a broader understanding of IS becomes possible. 
Much of the research about the group focuses on easily obtainable open-source reporting 
and re-reporting failing to delve into the nuances of this particular fundamentalist version 
of Islam, and in particular, Sharia law. This type of data collection, void of much 
meaningful analysis, can be seen by the Soufan Group’s Richard Barrett, whose report 
The Islamic State29 provides an excellent resource for facts but falls short of addressing 
implications. This is in stark contrast to Jay Sekulow, a lawyer whose book, “The Rise of 
ISIS: A Threat We Can’t Ignore,”30 seems to be full of the author’s personal bias and 
contains little factual information.  
A few publications successfully provide an in-depth and thoughtful discussion 
about the Islamic State. The most notable is another piece published in the Atlantic. In 
March 2015, Graeme Wood published a one-of-a-kind article, “What ISIS Really 
28 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” Atlantic, August 2006, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/
304983/. 
29 Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State” (The Soufan Group, November 2014),. 
http://soufangroup.com/the-islamic-state/. 
30 Jay Sekulow, Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can’t Ignore (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014). 
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Wants,”31 which incorporates his personal interviews of IS supporters. Wood uniquely 
identifies the tenets of the Caliphate, providing insight to the group’s ideology. In doing 
so, Wood also illuminates the motivation and goals of IS. This examination of the base of 
the IS belief system serves as the foundation for beginning to understand the psychology 
behind the effective recruitment and radicalization of IS supporters. Perhaps surprisingly, 
publications in the scholarly realm tend to focus on the Islamic State in relation to U.S. 
and international policy implications, such as the University of Western Sydney’s 
Andrew Kelly, in his article in Flinders Journal of History and Politics. There are a few 
notable exceptions offering analytical insight into the Islamic State, but these examples 
seem to straddle the line between scholarly journals and news media. The Atlantic articles 
mentioned earlier would fall into this category, as well as Conor Meleady’s piece, “New 
Caliphate, Old Caliphate” published in London’s History Today. 
B. TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET  
There is a large volume and wide array of research and analytical products 
assessing the evolution of terrorism alongside the internet revolution. Some of the 
findings from this research are quantitative and quickly become outdated as the 
technology continues to advance, online platforms continue to evolve, and access to the 
platforms increases. There are also a number of research pieces that assess the use of the 
internet by terrorists from a more interpretive perspective, examining the trends and 
implications of an online society and the opportunities that presents to the modern 
terrorist organization. 
Ashlee Woods’s 2007 article “Terrorists and the internet,”32 despite being several 
years old on a topic of emerging technology, was a trailblazer in identifying the various 
ways terrorist organizations can exploit the internet. Woods sets the standard for parsing 
out online resources for terrorist propaganda, fund-raising, recruitment, networking, and 
information flow. She also introduces the concept of psychological warfare as a 
legitimate online tactic. These themes are frequently repeated, and at times expanded 
                                                 
31 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” Atlantic, March 2015. 
32 Woods, “Terrorists and the internet.” 
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upon, in many subsequent publications. One notable update to Woods’s research comes 
from Manuel Torres Soriano, a scholar who is well known and respected in the 
community of Islamic Extremism research. Torres Soriano’s 2012 publication, “Between 
the Pen and the Sword: The Global Media Front in the West,”33 digs into the effect of 
terrorist organizations pushing their agenda through jihadist propaganda. The article also 
begins to bridge the gap in exploring the relationship between propaganda and 
radicalization and recruitment. A similar article, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review 
of Online Terrorism”34 also published in 2012 in the nascent Pakistani National Police 
Academy’s journal Pakistan Journal of Criminology, continues this examination by 
looking at the movement from jihadist web forums to social media, and the subsequent 
effects on homegrown violent extremists (HVE). Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy adds a relevant foundation for assessing the evolution of online 
jihadism in his article “The State of Global Jihad Online.”35 Zelin develops a framework 
for tracking the development of online terrorist activity, establishing a four-phase 
incremental sophistication of terrorist communication that coincides with the available 
technology. Zelin’s unique research establishes phase 1 as traditional printed material and 
video tapes. This then transitioned into phase 2, comprised of top-down or domain-based 
websites in the mid-1990s. By the mid-2000s, this had been largely replaced by 
interactive web forums in phase 3. Finally, the web forums were supplemented in the late 
2000s by the introduction and mass adaptation to social media in phase 4. This 
progression nicely overlaps other existing research to provide context to the relationship 
between the escalation of the technology and the escalation of the propaganda. 
The harmony breaks down and discourse becomes evident in the research when 
we begin to examine the ultimate effects of the internet on terrorism. In a very public 
disagreement, David Tucker criticizes terrorism expert Marc Sageman. In his 2008 book 
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Sageman asserts that 
33 Torres-Soriano, “Between the Pen and the Sword.” 
34 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Jack Newman, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review of Online 
Terrorism,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3, no. 3 (2012): 103–22. 
35 Aaron Zelin and Richard Borow Fellow, “The State of Global Jihad Online” (Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, January 2013). 
 12 
beginning in 2004, terrorist interactions ceased to occur face-to-face and instead began to 
occur online. He argues that the internet has replaced the mosque as the social gathering 
point for terrorists, both in a social aspect as well as for logistical purposes.36 Tucker 
takes a thoughtful and methodical approach to dismantling Sageman’s hypothesis by 
taking a close look at the cases Sageman provides as evidence.37 Tucker insinuates that 
Sageman presented the data in such a manner to give the appearance of supporting his 
claims. This very public debate depicts opposing points of view on the topic and 
represents a divide in the assessment of how the internet has affected terrorism. The 
research seems united and consistent in acknowledging the growing use of the internet by 
terrorists; however, debate remains regarding how it is used and to what level of success. 
One additional outlier in the research comes from David Benson’s 2014 article, 
“Why the internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism,”38 published in Security Studies. Benson 
presents a counterargument to the majority of available research, positing “although 
access to the internet has increased across the globe there has been no corresponding 
increase in completed transnational terrorist attacks…the internet is not a force multiplier 
for transnational terrorist organizations.”39 Benson claims there is little empirical data to 
establish a causal relationship between the internet and terrorist attacks. Benson expresses 
an unpopular opinion, backing himself into a corner by correlating the growth of terrorist 
organizations with the completion of transnational attacks, while many other researchers 
broaden the aperture of terrorist activities beyond attacks, and include the previously 
mentioned categories of fund-raising, recruitment, etc. It seems unlikely, even if we use 
Benson’s metric of a completed transnational attack, that this lack of correlation between 
internet usage and transnational attacks will remain the case in the next several years. 
                                                 
36 Tucker, “Jihad Dramatically Transformed?” 
37 Ibid. 
38 David C. Benson, “Why the internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism,” Security Studies 23, no. 2 (April 
3, 2014): 293–328, doi:10.1080/09636412.2014.905353. 
39 Ibid. 
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C. THE ISLAMIC STATE’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
In contrast to the prevalence of literature surrounding the broader exploration of 
terrorist use of the internet, there is a small but emerging collection of available research 
specifically addressing the use of social media by the Islamic State. Much of what is 
available comes in the form of anecdotal press reporting. There is some value in 
exploring and collating this material; however, the challenge lies in parsing out circular 
reporting and identifying credible sourcing. Examining this information may prove useful 
in collecting data about incidents, but will not likely provide analytical or evaluative 
insight.  
Playing off of the aforementioned Woods article, the National Defense University 
duo of Heather Vitale and James Keagle apply the foundations to their piece “A Time to 
Tweet, as Well as a Time to Kill: ISIS’s Projection of Power in Iraq and Syria.”40 In this 
comprehensive paper, Vitale and Keagle identify the four areas of IS online power as 
military, economic, political, and informational, echoing the findings of Woods minus the 
aspect of fund-raising. They also break down the structure of IS’s use of social media, 
evaluating the hierarchy of their usage. Vitale and Keagle examine the multi-leveled use 
of social media, from the official IS media centers to central leadership down to 
operatives and supporters. Brandeis University professor Jyette Klausen complements 
this research by examining the role of feeder accounts to disseminate propaganda to large 
audiences, tackling the aspect of distribution methods. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive empirical piece is the Brookings Institute’s 
landmark study, published and briefed to Congress in March 2015, titled “The ISIS 
Twitter Census.”41 The research focused on the timeframe of September to December 
2014 to quantitatively catalog the Islamic State’s use of Twitter. The study explored the 
volume of accounts linked to Islamic State supporters, as well as an evaluation of the 
geography and gender of users. This evaluation contained an analytical component, as 
40 Heather Marie Vitale and James M. Keagle, “A Time to Tweet, as Well as a Time to Kill: ISIS’s 
Projection of Power in Iraq and Syria,” Defense Horizons, no. 77 (2014): 1. 
41 J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter.” Brookings Institute, March 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-the-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/. 
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assignment of region and gender is based on non-specific information provided by the 
user in their profile. (For example, if the user has the title “Umm” she is identified as 
female.) This unscientific method is necessary as a result of operational security 
requirements put in place by the Islamic State to limit identifying information, including 
banning the use of the GPS function on Twitter. The study identified approximately 
46,000 accounts linked to the Islamic State, not all of which were active simultaneously. 
Notably, it was further determined that most IS social media activity can be attributed to 
a small group (numbering 500–2000) of “hyperactive users” who Tweet in “concentrated 
bursts of high volume.”42 
Juxtaposing the empirical with the analytical, Catholic University of Milan 
professor Marco Lombardi provides a lengthy evaluation of the Islamic State’s online 
communication as an asset in his study, “Islamic State Communication Project.”43 
Lombardi accomplishes this through multiple case studies, digging into the intended 
versus actual online messaging and comparing it with the actions taken by the group. He 
provides case examples across social media platforms. This paper is significant in its 
evaluative examination of online communication and the effect of violent content on 
recruitment and radicalization. Lombardi’s analysis may help connect the missing piece 
on the psychology of recruits and the process of radicalization despite exposure to 
extreme propaganda.  
D. THE ISLAMIC STATE’S RECRUITMENT 
There is a general consensus that the Islamic State has taken the principles present 
in the AQ recruiting manual and modified them for use online. This is perhaps most 
succinctly articulated in the July 2015 Business Insider article titled “Here’s the Manual 
That Al Qaeda and Now ISIS Use to Brainwash People Online.”44 This piece, coupled 
with the Brookings Institute’s 2010 report “Al Qaeda’s Growth and Recruitment 
                                                 
42 Berger and Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census.”  
43 Marco Lombardi, “Islamic State Communication Project,” Security, Terrorism, Society 
International Journal, January 2015. 
44 Pamela Engel, “Here’s the Manual That Al Qaeda and Now ISIS Use to Brainwash People Online,” 
Business Insider, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-manual-al-qaeda-and-now-
isis-use-to-brainwash-people-online-2015-7. 
15 
Strategy,”45 provides the foundation of modern terrorist recruitment practices. These 
publications highlight the significant aspect that although the medium may have changed 
due to the application of the internet, the basic process of recruitment is largely unaltered. 
If anything, the practice is merely simplified, expedited, and conducted en masse. The 
majority of the available literature asserts or implies that IS has exponentially 
outperformed AQ in the category of recruitment, with particular success in recruiting and 
radicalizing disaffected youth. One notable dissenting voice in the crowd comes from 
University of North Carolina communications professor Cori Dauber,46 who argues that 
too little is known about the recruitment process and the evolution to radicalization to say 
with any certainty that this is attributable to the online shrewdness of the IS. Dauber 
argues that absent direct personal interviews with the radicalized individuals, and a more 
substantial review of the online propaganda, we cannot establish as fact a cause-and-
effect relationship. 
In addition to the analytical material regarding recruitment, there is an ever-
growing pool of case studies documenting individual accounts and personal experiences 
with IS operatives. This literature appears to come primarily from journalists and takes on 
one of two perspectives: either the journalist is functioning in a covert capacity and 
interacting directly with the IS recruiter, or the journalist is interviewing an actual 
potential recruit regarding his or her experience. Many of the articles provide little insight 
or information of value, relying instead on the sensationalism of the reporting by focusing 
on targeting or tactical information obtained in the online exchange with the IS 
operatives.  
There are some notable exceptions. In her June 2015 New York Times piece titled 
“ISIS and the Lonely Young American,”47 Rukmini Callimachi looks at the personal 
experience of an isolated 23-year-old woman in rural Washington, her secret conversion 
to Muslim, and her gradual radicalization. The story is told through a series of interviews 
45 Daniel L. Byman, “Al Qaeda’s Growth and Recruitment Strategy,” The Brookings Institution, 
December 7, 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/07-al-qaeda-byman. 
46 Cori Dauber, “ISIS and the Family Man,” Small Wars Journal, July 1, 2015. 
47 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” New York Times, June 27, 2015. 
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with the target and her family, as well as Callimachi’s review of the logged online 
communications. This account is substantial, detailing the mindset of the target as well as 
the various tactics the recruiter and his associates employed to gradually radicalize and 
convert the target. This piece provides needed insight into the psychology and 
vulnerability of potential recruits. It may also illuminate some distinctions between 
genders as it pertains to tactics of recruiters and traits of potential recruits. 
Another noteworthy case study is the book In the Skin of a Jihadist: A Young 
Journalist Enters the ISIS Recruitment Network,48 authored by a French journalist using 
the pseudonym Anna Erelle. Despite the author infusing the narrative with additional and 
unneeded personal details and dramatic effects, the crux of the story is chilling. Erelle 
details her undercover relationship with a high-level IS commander, Abu Bilel al-Firanzi, 
which occurred in the months leading up to the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in 
June 2014. In documenting her exchanges with al-Firanzi, we witness the persistent, 
controlling, and at times berating manner in which she is treated. We are also provided a 
glimpse into the male/female relationships and the status of women in the Islamic State 
and as defined by Sharia Law. Perhaps most revealing in this story is the underlying, and 
at times blatant, sexual overtones of the recruiter toward the female target. This book 
provides a unique glimpse into the dichotomy present in the recruitment of young 
females. There is an overlapping and sometimes opposing duality of extreme traditional 
values and practices mixed with sexual urges.  
E. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION 
Very little research looks directly at the psychology behind the recruitment and 
radicalization specifically associated with IS. The most relevant research is found in a 
pair of articles published by journalist Katrin Bennold in the New York Times. In the 
articles, Bennold looks at the phenomena of female recruitment and radicalization in 
Britain. In her August 2015 article, “Jihad and Girl Power: How ISIS Lured 3 London 
                                                 
48 Anna Erelle, In the Skin of a Jihadist: A Young Journalist Enters the ISIS Recruitment Network 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2015). 
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Girls,”49 she focuses on the high-profile travel of three Muslim teenage girls from 
London to Syria to marry and support IS in February 2015. Through interviews of family 
members and friends, Bennold is able to enlighten on the social aspect of the recruitment 
process. The article follows shortly after her July 2015 article, “Britain Is Losing Against 
ISIS Recruitment Tactics.”50 In this article, Bennold examines the idea of “Brand 
Caliphate” and the marketing success of IS. She is also a lone voice in identifying the 
important distinction between the view of the Islamic State as a terrorist organization 
versus the view of the Islamic State as a Caliphate, or independent state actor. We see this 
dawning realization in one of Bennold’s interviews: 
“You wouldn’t join a terrorist group unless you agreed with it 100 
percent,” one senior British official said. “But you can be 100 percent 
behind the idea of a state and still disagree with some of the things it 
does.” That extends the pool of potential recruits well beyond those who 
condone beheadings, he said.51 
In both articles, Bennold broaches the concept that IS has obtained a type of rock 
star status, and the draw for young people to the group is verging on trendy. She further 
identifies the uniqueness of the female recruit, establishing the radicalization as a form of 
empowerment in the eyes of the recruit, who feels shunned and misunderstood in modern 
Western society. 
Bennold’s articles dovetail with the work of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
which has published a two-part research series evaluating the draw of women to IS. The 
first article, “Becoming Mulan: Female Western Migrants to ISIS,”52 was published in 
January 2015 and begins to examine the aspects of female travel to the Caliphate and the 
reality of life once the recruit arrives. The institute’s follow-up piece, “Til Martyrdom Do 
49 Katrin Bennhold, “Jihad and Girl Power How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls,” New York Times, 
August 17, 2015. 
50 Katrin Bennhold, “Britain Is Losing Against ISIS Recruitment Tactics,” New York Times, July 29, 
2015. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett, “Becoming Mulan: Female Western 
Migrants to ISIS,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, January 2015, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.pdf. 
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Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,”53 is perhaps more applicable, expanding on 
the first piece and looking at the “push” and “pull” of factors involved in recruitment and 
dispelling the myth that women are traveling to the Caliphate for the purpose of 
becoming a jihadi bride. In the papers, the authors ultimately conclude that a broad 
profile of at-risk females cannot be determined, and females who are susceptible to 
radicalization are so due to a myriad of diverse reasons. The research was conducted in 
cooperation with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ICSR), which in January 2009 first addressed the issue of online radicalization 
in their policy piece, “Countering Online Radicalisation.”54 Although this research 
predates the current IS-saturated environment and focuses primarily on suggested 
countermeasures, the document provides a needed baseline and counterpoint for 
understanding the current state of affairs. In the beginning of the paper, the authors cite 
research that indicates, “While the internet provides a convenient platform for activists to 
renew their commitment and reach out to like-minded individuals elsewhere, it is largely 
ineffective when it comes to drawing in new recruits.”55 During the same timeframe, the 
Department of Homeland Security published a counterpoint research paper titled, “The 
internet as a Terrorist Tool for Recruitment and Radicalization of Youth,”56 which aptly 
identifies the internet as a “radicalization accelerant.” In June 2015, the ICSR followed 
up with a brief article, “The Roots of Radicalization: It’s Identity Stupid,”57 which sets 
the tone for social identity theory’s role in the dynamic of radicalization. The article’s 
author, Shiraz Maher, begins to link aspects of the process of radicalization to broader 
                                                 
53 Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part Gender and the ISIS 
Phenomenon,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, May 2015, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf. 
54 Tim Stevens and Peter R. Neumann, “Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action,” 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 2009, http://icsr.info/
wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf. 
55 Ibid., 13. 
56 Catherine Bott, “The internet as a Terrorist Tool for Recruitment and Radicalization of Youth,” 
White paper. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, April 24, 2009, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/docs/reports/internet_Radicalization.pdf. 
57 Shiraz Maher, “The Roots of Radicalisation: It’s Identity, Stupid,” International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, June 23, 2015, http://icsr.info/2015/06/icsr-insight-roots-
radicalisation-identity-stupid/. 
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psychological theories. She argues, “strip away all the grievances and myriad individual 
triggers that might drive an individual to join an extremist group and you find underlying 
issues of identity and belonging.”58  
Outside of the previous referenced material pertaining to IS, there exists a vast 
amount of material available regarding different psychological theories and frameworks 
to radicalization. Some notable standouts in the field include the husband and wife 
research team of Alex Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, who take a transformative 
learning theory approach to understanding radicalization in their research titled 
“Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization.”59 
In this paper, they argue that there are identified triggering factors in individuals, which 
lead a potential recruit to reflect upon their personal belief system and ultimately make a 
decision about altering their behavior. Another theory-based approach of note is found in 
William Costanza’s doctoral thesis for Georgetown University, “An Interdisciplinary 
Framework to Assess the Radicalization of Youth Towards Violent Extremism Across 
Cultures.”60 In this technical research paper, Costanza argues there is no “casual 
paradigm” of radicalization, and instead uses positioning theory and discursive 
psychology to understand “how radicalization may occur at the individual level in various 
sociocultural contexts as a product of lived experience.”61 
An alternate and popular framework is found in the work of Georgetown 
University professor Fathali Moghaddam and his 2005 publication “The Staircase to 
Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.”62 In this paper, he takes a social identity 
theory–based examination of the individual escalation into full radicalization through a 
                                                 
58 Maher, “The Roots of Radicalisation: It’s Identity, Stupid.” 
59 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning 
Theory to Islamist Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 5 (April 20, 2011): 418–38, 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.561472. 
60 William Anthony Costanza, “An Interdisciplinary Framework to Assess the Radicalization of 
Youth Towards Violent Extremism Across Cultures,” 2012, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/
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61 Ibid. 
62 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–69, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.60.2. 
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series of consecutive steps or “stairs” of increasing commitment to terrorism. 
Moghaddam explains, “terrorism can best be understood through a focus on the 
psychological interpretation of material conditions and the options seen to be available to 
overcome perceived injustices.”63  
Challenging the tendency to define the radicalization process in linear terms, the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins have developed a 
puzzle-based approach to examining radicalization.64 Hafez and Mullins assert 
The attempt to shift the focus away from profiling extremists to profiling 
the radicalization pathways they take…has failed to yield a conclusive 
model of radicalization…we have the piece of the puzzle, but we lack the 
representative image that informs us how best to put them together. The 
pieces of the puzzle consist of grievances, networks, ideologies and 
enabling environments and support structures. Each piece of the puzzle 
can come in a different representation just like similarly structured jigsaw 
puzzles could reveal diverse images once their pieces are 
interconnected.65 
What is left to be determined is the applicability of these models when the 
radicalization and commitment is to a group that supporters identify as a legitimate 
government entity. 
F. ANALYZING THE DATA 
Jeffrey Bardzell, associate professor of informatics at Indiana University 
Bloomington, states, “Discourse analysis is a scientific and empirical strategy of textual 
analysis.”66 For the purpose of this thesis, the terms “discourse analysis” and “textual 
analysis” will be used interchangeably. The amount of available, detailed, and academic 
literature regarding discourse analysis is massive. There is also a large array of 
frameworks and methods available to conduct the type of analysis required by this thesis. 
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65 Ibid. 
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Narrowing the scope of the framework to using a textual-analysis approach still left many 
available options. Ole B. Jensen, professor of urban theory at Aalborg University in 
Denmark discusses the numerous available discourse analysis frameworks and methods: 
The question is, whether it is possible to make a coherent approach to 
discourse analysis on the background of these various and very different 
theoretical and analytical approaches? There exists many 
incommensurabilities at the ontological level of the theories.… So it is 
maintained that a discourse analysis is an analysis of the power-rationality 
configuration of particular practices and meaning-relations. The agents 
and institutions must be considered, as well the hermeneutic practice of 
interpreting documents and actions.67 
In an effort to refine the search for a useful and workable framework, I searched 
for examples of textual analyses similar to content and medium as this thesis. The results 
yielded a study conducted by Professor Esther Solis Al-Tabaa from the University of 
Texas at El Paso. In her article, “Targeting a Female Audience: American Muslim 
Women’s Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Al-Tabaa examines the effect of al-
Qaida’s propaganda on women using textual analysis.68 Al-Tabaa selected the framework 
designed by Dr. Garth Jowett, University of Houston, and Victoria O’Donnell, Montana 
State University, in their popular book Propaganda and Persuasion.69 In this book, 
Jowett and O’Donnell detail a 10-step framework for conducting discourse analysis of 
propaganda.70 This framework ultimately provided a rigorous but scoped method to 
apply in this thesis, focusing on propaganda as the form of communication being 
evaluated.  
G. CONCLUSION 
A review of the literature indicates there is a significant volume of literature 
available regarding IS and its use of the internet and social media as a propaganda and 
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recruitment tool. There is a growing pool of research surrounding how this use affects 
recruitment. Further, there is a vast amount of broad-based research regarding the 
psychology of radicalization and recruitment, but there is very little data specific to the 
successful recruitment strategy of IS. A number of products have been published that 
begin to explore the recruitment of women as IS supporters and operatives, but an 
information gap exists in exploring the differences in this process between men and 
women. 
Much of the available literature approaches the topic of radicalization and 
recruitment from different backgrounds and frameworks; however, there appear to be two 
common themes between the research and analysis. The first is that there is no profile of 
a potential recruit. Radicalization is not a one-size-fits-all process. The second is that 
there is a social aspect to being susceptible to recruitment. Whether this comes in the 
form of perceived injustice or isolation, the underlying draw is a sense of belonging and 
community. 
In this thesis I use the background and context outlined earlier to conduct a textual 
analysis, providing a foundation and framework in which IS propaganda can be evaluated 
and ultimately making a reasonable determination as to the likelihood that targeted 
propaganda toward the genders exists. Further, through the examination of select case 
studies of recruited or near-recruited females, I will examine how or if this propaganda 
relates to their radicalization. By knowing if there is targeted propaganda toward the 
genders and what role it plays in the radicalization of women, we can better tailor an 




A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This is an evaluation of the effect of the Islamic State’s online marketing machine 
on their recruitment and how their messaging has affected this recruitment by gender. 
This leads to two questions: Is there in fact targeted messaging toward females being 
disseminated by the IS propaganda machine, and if so, does that targeted messaging 
influence the radicalization and recruitment of females to IS? 
B. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Evaluating data as amorphous and voluminous as the propaganda disseminated by 
IS creates numerous challenges. Patrick von Maravic, professor at Zeppelin University in 
Germany, highlights the “consequences of researching difficult-access problems for 
doing multi-method research.”71 Von Maravic focuses on the difficulty of conducting 
research on a subject who is not cooperating with the evaluation. He explains the problem 
as resulting in  
scientific inquiry that follows the conventional paradigm of 
professionalism, transparency, and replicable research reaches its limits 
when confronted with the active resistance of phenomena that do not like 
to be observed, understood, or critically approached. From this flows, the 
necessity to think about interdisciplinary, collaborative, and investigative 
modes of research that come with various prices.72 
Acknowledging the limitations presented by von Maravic when analyzing a 
terrorist organization, this thesis will focus on using textual analysis of IS propaganda. 
Professor Alan McKee of the University of Technology in Sydney, Australia, examines 
the definition of textual analysis, describing it as 
a methodology—a data-gathering process—for those researchers who 
want to understand the ways in which members of various cultures and 
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subcultures make sense of who they are, and how they fit into the world in 
which they live…when we perform textual analysis on text, we make an 
educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations that might be 
made of that text…in order to try and obtain a sense of the ways in which, 
in particular cultures at particular times, people make sense of the world 
around them.73 
This thesis will use the 10-step plan of propaganda analysis developed by Dr. 
Garth Jowett, professor of communications at the University of Houston, and Dr. Victoria 
O’Donnell, professor emeritus at Montana State University-Bozeman.74 Jowett and 
O’Donnell published the sixth edition of their popular book, Propaganda and 
Persuasion, in 2014, which was First published in 1986. 
In determining a model for use in conducting textual analysis of IS propaganda, I 
located prior academic research conducted on the propaganda of al-Qaida. When 
authoring her research and analysis for her paper “Targeting a Female Audience: 
American Muslim Women’s Perceptions of al-Qaida Propaganda,” Professor Esther Solis 
Al-Tabaa of the University of Texas at El Paso used the Jowett and O’Donnell model.75 
In his 1999 review of Jowett and O’Donnell’s model, Dr. Phil Harris of the Centre for 
Corporate and Public Affairs at Manchester Metropolitan University Business School 
highlights the popularity of the model. Harris identifies the Jowett and O’Donnell’s 
approach as “almost the standard text in the area.”76 He highlights the model as 
particularly useful in providing “insight both into the reality and evil of how propaganda 
can be used as a powerful communication tool.”77 
Through the use of Jowett and O’Donnell’s 10-step model, I will analyze IS 
propaganda, focusing primarily on the messaging distributed by their official al-Hayat 
Media Center, to determine if they are producing targeted messaging toward potential 
female recruits. 
                                                 
73 Alan McKee, Textual Analysis: A Beginner’s Guide (London, UK:SAGE Publications, 2003). 
74 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 
75 Al-Tabaa, “Targeting a Female Audience.” 
76 Phil Harris, “Propaganda and Persuasion Book Review” (Manchester Metropolitan University 
Business School, 1999), www.phil-harris.com/wp-content/uploads/Phil-Harris-bookreviews_JCM1.pdf. 
77 Ibid. 
 25 
C. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis will then attempt to determine the effect of the IS propaganda 
machine, referred to throughout as Brand Caliphate, on individual females who were 
recruited or near-recruited to IS. Cases will be selected based on available open-source 
material containing sufficient information regarding the females’ online activity and 
insight into any possible exposure to Brand Caliphate. Through an examination of these 
females and their stories of recruitment, we will attempt to determine the role and affect, 
if any, of Brand Caliphate in their radicalization. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
There are significant limitations that must be acknowledged in this thesis. In 
particular, when examining the case examples, this thesis is limited to publicly available 
reporting. Much of this information is collected from the subjects directly or others who 
they knew. Due to potential embarrassment, biases, and societal perceptions, the 
reporting may not be wholly accurate. The existence of additional online activity by the 
subjects in the case examples cannot be ruled out. Without full forensic examinations and 
exploitation of their electronic devices, we cannot have a true, unbiased view of their 
online activity. Further, there is no way, forensically or otherwise, to account for direct 
communications occurring in either direct online video calls or encrypted messaging. 
There is also no method by which to verify that the online accounts attributed to the 
individuals examined in the case studies were truly owned and used by them alone. For 
the purpose of this thesis and conducting the analysis contained within, the information 
evaluated is presumed to be credible. As a consequence of this limitation, the textual 
analysis can only be applied to the propaganda disseminated by, or on behalf of, IS 
through al-Hayat Media Center. The textual analysis cannot be directly applied to the 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 27 
IV. EVALUATING THE PROPAGANDA 
A. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis of IS propaganda must be conducted prior to determining whether or not 
a cause-and-effect relationship exists between the distributed messaging of Brand 
Caliphate and the number of females recruited to join IS. Does IS produce intentional, 
targeted messaging toward women for the purpose of facilitating their radicalization? In 
the absence of direct acknowledgment from the purveyor of the propaganda, in this case 
IS leadership, the best available method to make a determination is through textual 
analysis of the propaganda itself. 
Dr. Manuel R. Torres Soriano, professor of foreign policy and conflict processes 
at the University of Pablo de Olavide en Sevilla, describes the calling by Muslims to 
jihad: 
Muslims are obliged not only to wage the jihad against the enemies of 
Islam by taking up the sword (carrying out acts of violence) but also by 
using the pen (through communication and propaganda). This notion has 
found increasing favour in terrorist narrative in tandem with the spread of 
new information technologies, particularly the internet.78 
This concept of waging online jihad is mirrored by Ashlee Woods, who similarly 
states, “The War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been 
both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas…The War on Terrorism is both a conventional 
arms war and a transnational ideological movement.”79 The internet has provided a free, 
easily accessible, and widely available medium to facilitate implementation of this 
movement. 
Experts agree that the internet provides unique opportunities for terrorist 
organizations. The ease and anonymity provided through an online medium assists with 
recruitment, fund-raising, propaganda, internal communications, and training.80 There 
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has been a lack of discussion and evidence of IS specifically or successfully using the 
internet as a fund-raising tool. In fact, IS has managed to become one of the richest 
terrorist organizations in history without having to solicit funds, instead financing their 
campaign through a combination of seized funds from the Bank of Iraq, oil production on 
seized lands, and various criminal activities, including credit card fraud and hostage 
ransoming, extortion, and sales of stolen antiquities.81 However, IS has become 
proficient at using online resources and social media sites in particular in its recruitment 
and propaganda through the establishment of Brand Caliphate. Woods explains the 
process in which terrorist groups accomplish this online: 
Typical extremist websites’ propaganda packages include articles 
condemning the West, biographies of terrorists killed in battle [or as 
suicide bombers], biased accounts of the current war, and religious 
justification for the activities, transcripts of speeches, songs celebrating 
jihad, public statements from the group, and motivational films [often 
beheadings, war tapes, bomb detonations, etc…]. Terrorist organizations 
prey upon and advertise to disenfranchised youth globally by offering a 
“community-environment” in which recruits can become part of a larger 
ideological movement. The internet environment facilitates this 
community feeling and terrorist organizations intentionally use technology 
to create a sense of global connectedness.82 
In their article published in the Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Defense 
Horizons journal, Vitale and Keagle assess IS’s skillset in handling “the dissemination of 
information and propaganda is perhaps its greatest strength, and strongest contribution to 
its growth of power.”83 They further assert that through their use of social media “as a 
weapon of war,” IS campaigns have “the benefit of being widespread and 
multidimensional, bearing a massive effect.”84 This chapter will examine the content and 
intent of this propaganda, and what, if any, separate effect it has had on women. 
Jowett and O’Donnell developed a 10-step plan that identifies the following 
categories of consideration when conducting propaganda analysis: 
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• identification of ideology and purpose 
• identification of context 
• determining the propagandist 
• investigation of the structure of the organization responsible for the 
propaganda 
• identification of who is being targeted 
• understanding of the media techniques used by the propagandist 
• analysis of any special techniques used to increase the desired effect 
• analysis of audience reaction 
• identification and analysis of counterpropaganda 
• completion of an assessment and evaluation.85 
 The cumulative collection of IS propaganda available for consideration of such 
analysis is staggering. The implementation of a constant social media presence by 
recognized IS media centers, as well as contributions from operatives, sympathizers and 
those simply finding IS to be an online trend to contribute to, creates a sample size of 
data beyond the scope of this project. Therefore, the following propaganda analysis will 
apply Jowett and O’Donnell’s 10-step process and will focus primarily on 
communications issued from or sponsored by the recognized IS media center, al-Hayat 
Media Center, which functions as the official purveyor of Brand Caliphate and is 
considered “the central body of all ISIS’s media endeavors.”86  
1. Step 1—The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda Campaign 
The purpose of Brand Caliphate is simple. The propaganda campaign is intended 
to control the narrative. In doing so, the group is able to define their image and the story 
line, regardless of the facts. Landon Shroder writes about this on Vice News, suggesting 
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Brand Caliphate has allowed IS to “situate themselves at the center of a worldwide 
conversation on religion, politics, and war” and suggests the frequently violent content: 
has a twofold propaganda value: IS is not only defining exactly who they 
are, but who they are not as well, which resonates with a select group of 
people who equate extreme violence with power. More importantly, the 
brutality automatically narrows down the viewing audience, allowing the 
message to specifically target those who might be susceptible to 
radicalization.87 
In controlling the narrative, IS has accomplished a campaign of steady 
recruitment. This has either come in the form of radicalized supporters willing to travel to 
Syria to conduct jihad or local sympathizers willing to conduct attacks in their region or 
simply express their support via social media.  
All of the propaganda, narrative, and resulting recruitment are part of a larger 
effort to support, maintain, and legitimize the establishment of the Caliphate. In his 
article in the Atlantic, investigative journalist and contributing editor Graeme Wood 
states, “The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic.” Wood continues:  
much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a 
sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a 
seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the 
apocalypse. The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the 
Islamic State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively 
to “moderns.” In conversation, they insist that they will not—cannot—
waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the 
Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers.88 
Brand Caliphate’s sophisticated use of propaganda is merely a means to an end; a 
tool with which to assist in the ultimate goal of a prophesized apocalypse brought on 
through jihad. Jowett and O’Donnell make a distinction between two types of 
propaganda: integration propaganda, which “attempts to maintain the positions and 
interests represented by ‘officials’ who sponsor and sanction the propaganda messages,” 
and agitation propaganda, which “seeks to arouse people to participate in or support a 
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cause.”89 Through the al-Hayat Media Center, IS appears to be pursuing both of these 
motivations.  
There are various motivations for targeting females for recruitment to IS through 
propaganda. The most obvious purpose for targeting women for recruitment is to 
maintain the population of the Caliphate. Women are seen as necessary to procreate and 
are often viewed as rewards for jihadist fighters, who may maintain multiple families 
with multiple wives.90 
Mia Bloom, professor of communication at Georgia State University, suggests an 
additional and less obvious purpose for a targeted propaganda campaign toward women. 
Bloom claims terrorist organizations in general, and IS in particular, will continue to see 
more women recruits because 
every single group at the outset always says “we don’t need women.” 
Then at some point they actually do. They use women strategically if 
they’re having a problem recruiting men. Because society has rigid 
perceptions of masculinity, they taunt the idea of women doing the 
fighting and men staying at home, shaking in their boots, to provoke a 
response. So when you start recruiting women, you tap into another 50 
percent of the population, but you also guilt and shame men into stepping 
up.91 
Although IS does not seem to be plagued by low male-recruitment numbers, 
Bloom argues the motivation remains. As IS suffers losses due to coalition military 
strikes, the importance to replace and maintain the number of male fighters remains a 
priority. Recruiting women may be a means to an end; motivating other male recruits and 
offering opportunities for population growth through procreation. 
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2. Step 2—The Context in which the Propaganda Occurs 
Jowett and O’Donnell describe this step as assessing “the climate of the 
times…expected states of the world social system…the prevailing public mood.” They 
further stress the need to provide historical context in an effort to more accurately analyze 
propaganda. What is the environment that has allowed, and even fostered, a group such 
as IS to flourish? 
Looking at this question from a broad perspective, we gain insight into the context 
in the second edition of Dabiq magazine, which addresses its target audience of Muslims 
by chiding them for any perception of Western values and the concept of free choice. It 
states, 
until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it’s upon us all to 
work together to eradicate the principle of “free choice,”…Rather, we 
must confront them with the fact that they’ve turned away from the 
religion, while we hold onto it, grasping its purity, its clarity, its 
comprehensiveness, without any blemishes due to shirk…and that we are 
completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us 
from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all 
other religions, and that we will continue to fight the people of deviation 
and misguidance until we die trying to make the religion triumphant. 
This quote provides a succinct synopsis of the context of the current world 
environment as perceived by IS, and in doing so also provides insight to their motivation. 
The group espouses disdain for concepts viewed as highly valued by most Westerners, 
including moderate Muslims. Statements such as these clearly define the IS In Group, 
setting the standard and expectations of those who choose to align with the group. During 
the October 2015 Women in the World summit, Sara Khan, founder of the women’s 
human rights organization Inspire, stated, “The issue of identity is central in all of this; 
that Muslims don’t belong.”92  
This idea of a lack of belonging becomes more complicated when evaluating the 
context in the framework of targeting women. The context for women contains different 
considerations and nuances beyond that of simply being the brand of devout Muslim 
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described earlier. Henry Gass notes in the Christian Science Monitor that IS “appeal[s] to 
young Muslim women to turn their backs on the West for a more ‘authentic’ life.”93 
Gass’s explanation overgeneralizes a very complicated scenario. 
Christian Science Monitor staff writer Warren Richey has expressed an 
understanding of the more complicated factors surrounding women and radical Islam. He 
states 
they aren’t just fulfilling what they see as a religious duty. Their motives also 
reflect a counterculture revolt among Muslim women and girls who refuse to live 
as second-class citizens in the west…For them, it is suddenly both dangerous and 
cool to be a particular kind of Muslim. And that attraction can be irresistible.94 
Dr. Erin Saltman of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue echoes this, describing a 
“subculture punk movement” that is “secretive…empowering…against tradition and 
norms…you can see a bit of youth counterculture involved.”95 Brand Caliphate has 
become trendy. As paradoxical as it seems, the draw for young women to have the 
freedom to practice their brand of Islam outside of the scrutiny of Western judgment is 
powerful. Whether perceived or legitimate, the perception of being an outsider in the 
Western world is a motivating factor and the decision to support IS is repeatedly 
described as empowering in this context. 
Norwegian journalist Mah-Rukh Ali cautions us about possible implications of 
empathizing with the experiences of potential recruits. Ali urges, “there is a real danger 
that the humanizing effect of seeking reasons behind the brutalities can ultimately play 
directly into ISIS’s own propaganda, by creating an empathetic quality, a sense of 
understanding that serves to encourage potential recruits to join.”96 
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3. Step 3—Identification of the Propagandist
Vitale and Keagle identifies IS’s “masterful understanding of effective 
propaganda and social media use, producing a multidimensional global campaign across 
multiple platforms.”97 The al-Hayat Media Center is the hub of these communications 
and propaganda. Due to the nature of IS and a lack of transparency into its actions, it is 
assumed the al-Hayat Media Center answer to and are funded and sanctioned by IS 
central leadership.98 Al-Hayat Media Center is responsible for the production and 
distribution of the highly styled videos and magazines published on behalf of IS and 
holds accounts associated with leadership on Twitter for official announcements.99 The 
center is also a hub of information, with a scrolling visual effect on its homepage 
highlighting supportive Tweets.  
In an attempt to legitimize the organization and provide brand recognition, the 
Center’s logo closely resembles that of the legitimate Qatari-based network news 
organization, al Jazeera; see Figure 1.100 Al-Hayat Media Center is supplemented with 
numerous other IS media efforts, including al-Battar Media Group, the al-Furqaan 
Foundation, and many other local sites; however, it is the al-Hayat Media Center that is 
seen as the primary source for targeting Westerners for recruitment and radicalization.101 
When discussing Brand Caliphate, A. Agron of the Middle East Media Research Institute 
points out, “little is known about the inner workings of the ISIS media complex, 
however, it can be assumed that it is the senior ISIS officials who wield the power, 
functioning as the puppeteers pulling the strings and manipulating the online 
activists.”102 
97 Vitale and Keagle, “A Time to Tweet, as Well as a Time to Kill.” 
98 Jared Cohen, “Digital Counterinsurgency,” Foreign Affairs. 94 (2015): 52. 
99 Vitale and Keagle, “A Time to Tweet, as Well as a Time to Kill,” 7. 
100 Steve Rose, “The Isis Propaganda War: A Hi-Tech Media Jihad,” Guardian, October 7, 2014, sec. 
World News. 
101 Cohen, “Digital Counterinsurgency”; Vitale and Keagle, “A Time to Tweet, as Well as a Time to 
Kill,” 7. 
102 A. Agron, “Online Women Activists of the Islamic State—Where Are They Now?,” MEMRI— 




Figure 1.  Left: Al Jazzera Logo103; Right: al-Hayat Logo104 
We should exercise caution in making the assumption that the IS propagandist, 
even when produced, directed, distributed, or sanctioned by Al-Hayat, is a male. 
Although restricted in their freedoms within the Caliphate, the voice and influence of 
females on Brand Caliphate remains unknown. Amy Wharton, professor of sociology at 
Washington State University, argues that we tend to have a bias in assuming patriarchy, 
or at least patriarchal roles, within an agency.105 Acknowledging this bias as present, it 
can simply be said the internal workings, and the role of women within Al-Hayat, remain 
a mystery. 
4. Step 4—The Structure of the Propaganda Organization 
Al-Hayat (meaning “the Life”) is just one arm of a multi-tentacled media outreach 
campaign. Jared Cohen, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, details 
this in his article in Foreign Affairs. Cohen notes 
ISIS resembles something akin to a corporation. On the ground in Iraq and 
Syria, a highly educated leadership sets its ideological agenda, a 
managerial layer implements this ideology, and a large rank and file 
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contributes fighters, recruiters, videographers, jihadist wives, and people 
with every other necessary skill. This hierarchy is replicated online, where 
ISIS operates as a pyramid consisting of four types of digital fighters. 
Cohen identifies the top of the digital hierarchy as the central command of their 
operations. Although not stated outright, this can be equated to the al-Hayat Media 
Center as the entity who is highly organized, “gives orders and provides resources for 
disseminating content.”106 He then describes the hierarchy’s second level as pushers of 
the propaganda, the individuals responsible for the mass dissemination of the material. 
Specifically for IS, this translates to a small army of Twitter users. 
Evidence of this second level activity can be found in a landmark study published 
in March 2015 by the Brookings Institute. The study charted statistical data associated 
with IS Twitter accounts dating from September to December 2014. During that period, 
the study identified at least 46,000 Twitter accounts that were used by IS supporters, 
although all of the accounts were not active simultaneously. The institute was further able 
to determine that most IS social media activity can be attributed to a small group 
(numbering 500–2000) of “hyperactive users” who Tweet in “concentrated bursts of high 
volume.” This finding supports the claims of Vitale and Keagle, who studied IS hashtag 
campaigns (with a focus on the campaign #AllEyesOnISIS) and found that approximately 
“20 percent of the tweet volume in a given period belongs to a base number of users.”107  
Cohen identifies the third level of the hierarchy as the radical sympathizers, those 
who are persuaded by the propaganda, whom he identifies as the “digital fighter.”108 This 
group will be further examined in step five, the target audience. 
Cohen describes the final level of the hierarchy as “non-human…programmable 
army,” or artificial automated accounts. These are false accounts created by members of 
the second tier for the purpose of mass dissemination and the misperception of a greater 
volume of contributors than actually exists. This is accomplished through the use of 
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technology, including Twitter bots. Twitter bots are, according to the New Yorker, 
“essentially, computer programs that tweet of their own accord.”109 
5. Step 5—The Target Audience
Determining the target audience for Brand Caliphate and al-Hayat Media center 
can only be supposition at best, without confirmation from the producers of such material 
as to their intended audience. Jowett and O’Donnell identify the target audience as “the 
audience most likely to be useful to the propagandist if it responds favorably.”110 The 
term to parse out of this definition is the word “favorably.” It must be considered that 
there are in fact two target audiences intended to have a favorable reaction to the material 
distributed by IS—one being potential recruits or sympathizers, the other being the 
enemies of IS. Moreover, for each of the groups, the term “favorable” necessarily means 
something different. 
For example, in September 2014 IS released their 55-minute-long video titled The 
Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun. The opening scene is shown in Figure 2. The 
video is narrated by an IS fighter speaking English, in what sounds like an American 
dialect. The film depicts the gory siege of what is now the IS capital city of Raqqah, from 
the Syrian Army, which at one point is shown digging their own graves before being shot 
and falling into the pit. At the conclusion, Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi refers to the 
United States as the “defender of the cross” and claims the group will force the United 
States into “direct confrontation.”111 Clearly, the “favorable” response by the target 
audience to this particular piece of propaganda would be to intimidate, or possibly incite, 
the United States and its Western allies. However, a secondary targeting effect was seen 
as the video served to entice IS recruits and supporters. For example, former Illinois 
national guardsman Hasan Edmonds and his cousin Jonas Edmonds both pled guilty in 
December 2015 of a plot to attack the Joliet Armory with small arms in support of IS, 
hoping to kill up to 150 people. In online conversations with an undercover FBI agent, 
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111 Ryan Mauro, “ISIS Releases ‘Flames of War’ Feature Film to Intimidate West,” The Clarion 
Project, September 21, 2014. 
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Hasan Edmonds was quoted as saying he and Jonas would travel to the Caliphate, or else 
they would “bring the flames of war to the heart od [sic] this land with Allah’s 
permission” (emphasis added). The reference to the propaganda video provides evidence 
that the material had two target audiences. What remains unclear is whether this was 
intended by IS or a fortuitous unintended consequence. 
Figure 2.  Flames of War112 
There is another side of Brand Caliphate, which appears intended to appeal to 
females. One viral Twitter account depicts armed jihadists with cats.113 The account, the 
“Islamic State of Cats,” is just one of numerous accounts on Facebook and Twitter that 
attempt to depict the softer side of the Caliphate (see Figure 3). It remains unknown, but 
appears likely, whether these accounts are being directed from IS leadership as part of 
their official media campaign. 
112 Source: “Flames of War ISIS New Video Released,” Al-Hayat Media Center, digital image, 
December 8, 2014. https://sungermedia.wordpress.com. 
113 James Vincent, “‘I Can Haz Islamic State Plz’: Isis Propaganda on Twitter Turns to Kittens and 
Lolspeak,” Independent News, August 21, 2014. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/isis-propaganda-on-twitter-turns-to-kittens-and-lolspeak-i-can-haz-islamic-state-plz-9683736.html. 
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Figure 3.  ISIL Cats114 
6. Step 6—Media Utilization Techniques
IS has demonstrated a proficiency for using numerous platforms in various ways. 
Beyond their saturation of Twitter, IS uses the application as a distribution method to 
push out copies of their official propaganda produced through al-Hayat Media Center. 
Newly published items, including issues of Dabiq and Hollywood-like videos, are 
initially posted by al-Hayat Media Center and then mass-distributed by Cohen’s second-
level hierarchy, often via Tweeting and re-Tweeting the attachments. 
Tweeting and re-Tweeting allow for saturation of various types of media to a 
large audience. From the magazines to stylized scripted videos resembling a Frommer’s 




guide video to copies of key IS personnel giving speeches, the propaganda is produced 
and distributed via social media to Cohen’s third-level hierarchy. This is in addition to 
those susceptible to radicalization, including women. As Vitale and Keagle assess: 
ISIS employs its communications and social media campaigns in an 
exceptionally professional and sophisticated manner. Its propaganda, 
recruitment, and information operations are well conceived, slickly 
produced, and strategically circulated. The group has constructed 
interdependent networks for fast, real-time responses, and…displays a 
clever understanding of the media, allowing for innovation, manipulation, 
and exploitation of the message. The group’s immensely effective digital 
jihadist campaign set the new precedent for Islamic groups worldwide.115 
7. Step 7—Special Techniques to Maximize Effect
Jowett and O’Donnell break this section into several suggested subcategories, 
identifying examples of identifiable techniques as “links to values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
past behavior patterns of the target audience.”116 
a. Source Credibility and Opinion Leaders
The propaganda disseminated by the al-Hayat Media Center, by virtue of their 
status as the official media representative of IS, is instilled with credibility. The material 
published by the center is sanctioned by IS leadership and represents their official 
outreach. This provides an innate reliability to the information being produced. Indeed, 
propaganda originating from al-Hayat Media includes actual propaganda from IS 
leadership, including videos and statements from individuals believed to be high ranking 
in the organization. IS spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani regularly uses al-Hayat 
Media Center as a mechanism to release messages to supporters.117 
When specifically examining the targeting of women, often the credibility of the 
sourcing—and in fact the opinion leaders—comes from other women within the 
organization. For example, in February 2015 IS published a manual online titled Hijrah 
115 Vitale and Keagle, “A Time to Tweet, as Well as a Time to Kill,” 6. 
116 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 280. 
117 Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-’ Ubaydi, “CTC Perspectives—Al-Adnani’s Paradox: Projecting 
Strength While Feeling Fear,” October 16, 2015. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-al-
adnanis-paradox-projecting-strength-while-feeling-fear. 
41 
to the Islamic State, designed as an English language “how to” guide for Westerners who 
want to join IS.118 Listed in the manual are three online accounts to contact for assistance 
in traveling to Syria. One of them, Umm Waqqas, is believed to belong to a woman. She 
is thought to have been one of the contacts with whom three Denver teenage girls 
maintained online prior to departing in October 2014 in an attempt to travel to Syria and 
join IS.119 German authorities at Frankfurt International Airport ultimately intercepted 
the teens after one of their fathers contacted the FBI.120 
The evolution of women recruiting women online appears to legitimize the 
recruitment process. After all, who is more credible to a possible female recruit than 
someone who has already had the same experience? In an insightful article published in 
the Colorado College independent newspaper, author Jackson Paine notes: 
The social media aspect of the IS recruitment effort opens what had been a 
male-dominated world to females. Women who have joined IS are fluent 
users of social media and ready and available to help others seeking 
guidance and reassurance on their path to the Islamic State…The bonds 
that are forged in daily online communications can be both empowering 
and liberating for young Muslim women.121 
b. Group Norms
Jowett and O’Donnell explain this area of analysis as “beliefs, values, and 
behaviors derived from membership in groups.”122 Graeme Wood tackled this question in 
his article, describing IS group norms 
Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State 
adhere to what it calls in its press and pronouncements….”the Prophetic 
methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of 
118 “Hijrah to the Islamic State: ISIS Updates Its Manual for Foreign Fighters,” Crethiplethi, n.d., 
accessed April 17, 2016. www.crethiplethi.com/hijrah-to-the-islamic-state-isis-updates-its-manual-for-
foreign-fighters/intelligence-terrorism-information-center/2015/ .
119 Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “ISIS in America” (George Washington University, Program 
on Extremism, December 2015):21. 
120 Ibid., 21. 
121 Jackson Paine, “Why Do Women Join the Islamic State and Other Jihadist Organizations?,” 
Catalyst, September 5, 2015, http://catalystnewspaper.com/featured/why-do-women-join-the-islamic-state-
and-other-jihadist-organizations/. 
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Muhammad, in punctilious detail…Denying the holiness of the Koran or 
the prophecies of Muhammad is straightforward apostasy….many other 
acts can remove a Muslim from Islam…selling alcohol or drugs, wearing 
Western clothes or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election…being lax 
about calling other people apostates. Following takfiri doctrine, the 
Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers 
of people.123 
Wood’s article and assessment of IS’s brand of Islam has not gone without 
criticism. Caner Dagli, a professor of religious studies at the College of the Holy Cross, 
penned a response, also published in the Atlantic. Dagli argues that Wood depicts the IS 
interpretation as literal to Islamic texts and authentic Muslims, leading one to wonder 
what that makes Muslims who do not adhere to the IS brand of ideology. Dagli clarifies, 
“What distinguishes the interpretive approach of groups like ISIS from others is not its 
literalism…but its narrowness and rigidity; for the adherents of ISIS, the Quran means 
exactly one thing, and other levels of the meaning or alternate interpretations are ruled 
out a priori. This is not literalism. It is exclusivism.”124 
You do not need look far to discover the expected behaviors of women who 
belong to or wish to join IS. In January 2015, IS’s female police squad, Al-Khansaa 
Brigade, published a guide via al-Hayat Media Center for females living in the Caliphate. 
The document details the schooling requirements for young girls, with a focus on 
religious studies, science, and Arabic. It speaks out against Western cultural influences 
and encourages needed skills such as cooking and sewing. With regard to marriage, the 
guide states, “It is considered legitimate for a girl to be married at the age of nine. Most 
pure girls will be married by sixteen or seventeen, while they are still young and active.” 
After marriage, women are expected to stay in the home and care for the children. They 
are allowed to leave the house under certain “exceptional” circumstances, if properly 
covered up. These include “jihad by appointment,” studying religion, and if they are 
123 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.” 
124 Caner K. Dagli, “The Phony Islam of ISIS,” Atlantic, February 27, 2015, 
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functioning as a doctor or teacher under Shariah guidelines. If this work does call the 
woman from the home, it may not do so for more than three days a week.125 
In a blog titled 20 Lessons We’ve Learned After Hijrah, one individual identified 
as Mother U wrote 
Being here has taught me to reconnect with the fitrah [inherent nature] as 
women, wives, mothers and even daughters…Being in a non-Muslim 
society contaminates your mind whether it be with a sexualized view of 
women or feminist ideals of how women should and shouldn’t be, whether 
we think it has affected us or not.126 
Both the blog posting and the manual serve to define the social norms, or 
boundaries, for women, by women. By having a female present these limitations, this 
propaganda potentially gains greater credibility with susceptible females. 
c. Reward and Punishment
The concept of reward and punishment can be very black and white when 
considered through the lens of Sharia Law. Jowett and O’Donnell highlight the idea of 
using “threats and physical inducements toward compliance.”127 The social norms 
highlighted earlier and spelled out in the strict interpretation of Islam set out the 
expectations. The propaganda pushed out by IS highlights the consequences of both 
adhering to and failing to abide by these rules. Adherence leads to rewards including an 
eternal life in paradise. Propaganda includes text and images depicting a utopian life in 
the Caliphate. The al-Hayat Media Center plays a role in the production of tourist-like 
videos, depicting children smiling in the sunshine of the Caliphate. The ads could be 
mistaken for Disney timeshare videos at first glance, until the camera zooms in on a 
toddler, who is holding a firearm.128 
125 Charlie Winter, “Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al-Khanssaa 
Brigade” (Quilliam (translation and analysis of Al-Khanssaa Brigade Manifesto), February 2015).  
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127 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 282. 
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Alternately, IS has saturated online media with horrific images of what happens to 
those who do not comply. There are too many images and videos of soldiers and 
journalists being beheaded or shot execution-style to list. Video of the execution by 
burning in a public square of a captured Jordanian pilot in early 2015 was released and 
picked up by the international news media. More intimate videos and photos are regularly 
released depicting executions of members of the Caliphate who have broken the rules. 
These include throwing men from the roofs of buildings for being homosexual to 
beheading a 16-year-old boy for missing Friday prayer.129  
In discussing IS propaganda postings, Brandeis University professor Dr. Jytte 
Klausen highlights the increasing brutality witnessed on IS associated accounts beginning 
in early 2014, juxtaposed against images from a “normal” life: 
After the insurgents moved into Iraq, the content became increasingly 
gruesome. In April “Abu Daighum al-Britani,” a British fighter with ISIL, 
used Twitter to circulate a screenshot made using Instagram of himself 
holding a severed head. By August, Twitter had served up stills from 
videos of ongoing beheadings, severed heads on fence posts, rows of 
crucified men hung on crosses on a platform in a dusty town like an image 
from a bad movie, and even a picture of a seven-year-old Australian boy 
holding a severed head offered to him by his father. The execution of 
James W. Foley provoked the American public and brought the United 
States into the conflict. The pictures of violence starkly highlighted the 
role played by social media in contemporary terrorist tactics. But it is not 
all brutal horror on Twitter. Tweets of cats and images of camaraderie 
bridge the real-life gap between Strasbourg, Cardiff, or suburban Denver, 
and being in a war zone.130 
As previously mentioned, within the Caliphate women are responsible for the 
monitoring and punishment of other women. Established and announced in February 
2014, prior to the official declaration of the Caliphate, the Al-Khansaa Brigade is a group 
of females who carry out these tasks.131 Known as the “moral police” or the “morality 
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enforcement brigade,” the female policing unit is a prominent fixture in Raqqa.132 In an 
article published in the Atlantic, Senior Editor Kathy Gilsinan recounts the story of a 
teenage female as told to the local investigative publication Syria Deeply, describing how 
she was “snatched from the street by a group of armed women for walking without an 
escort and wearing her headscarf incorrectly.”133 She explained how one member of the 
brigade pointed a weapon at her, and how she was quizzed about her knowledge of Sharia 
Law.134 
Former Times magazine Middle East correspondent Azadeh Moaveni reported an 
interview of three Al-Khansaa Brigade defectors in the New York Times. In the article, 
Moaveni details moment when one of the young women watched two family friends 
whipped as punishment for wearing abayas, or black robes, that were considered too 
tight.135 The girl described the incident, stating 
officers took the women into a back room to be whipped. When they 
removed their face-concealing niqabs, her friends were also found to be 
wearing makeup. It was 20 lashes for the abaya offense, five for the 
makeup, and another five for not being meek enough when detained.136 
As a part of her piece in the Atlantic, Gilsinan interviewed Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment expert Thomas Hegghammer regarding the effect of social media 
on female support of IS. Hegghammer stated, “many of them are eager to portray 
themselves as strong women and often make fun of the Western stereotype of ‘the 
oppressed Muslim woman’…On social media at least, I think we can speak of a nascent 
‘jihadi girl power’ subculture.”137 
Moaveni’s interviews shed further light on the recruitment process for women. 
Highlighting personal experience of women inside the Caliphate, the former Al-Khansaa 
132 Kathy Gilsinan, “The ISIS Crackdown on Women, by Women,” Atlantic, July 25, 2014. 
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Brigade members recall being allowed only to use the internet for specific reasons, one of 
which was in the capacity of a recruiter to “woo new fighters and foreign women to 
Syria.”138 This reporting directly from Al-Khansaa Brigade defectors provides insight 
and correlation to an organized effort by Caliphate leaders to coordinate an online 
presence of women recruiting other women. 
d. Visual Symbols of Power 
Visual symbols of power are prominent throughout IS propaganda. As already 
mentioned, the al-Hayat Media Center’s official logo was designed to be nearly identical 
to that of the news organization al Jazeera. However, the more prominent and 
recognizable symbol is that of the black-and-white Islamic State flag, as shown in Figure 
4. Having mastered the branding aspect of Brand Caliphate, the logo emblazoned on the 
flag has become instantaneously recognizable and associated with IS. It is typically 
clearly displayed in official IS propaganda as well as in the online postings of IS 
supporters. A March 2015 study by the Brookings Institute found that “the most common 
profile picture was easily the iconic black and white flag used by ISIS in its official 
documents and propaganda.” The next most common imagery involved Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, the Caliph of the Caliphate.139 
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Figure 4.  Islamic State Flag140 
Brand Caliphate has also manipulated the visual symbols of power to appeal to 
women. By using images to depict anti-IS forces as the aggressor, beating down the pious 
Caliphate, they may be attempting to elicit a more feminine or motherly response of 
empathy toward the Caliphate. Brand Caliphate often includes graphic images of the 
aftermath of bombing attacks by government forces, including the United States141 By 
using these images of power, often depicting mutilated villages and children, Brand 
Caliphate crafts the narrative, labeling themselves as the underdog (David) to the 
unbelievers(Goliath) who are oppressing them. This type of imagery and symbol of 
power likely appeals to stereotyped responses in both genders, evoking in men anger and 
a desire to fight and in women, sorrow and a desire to protect. 
140 Source: “Islamic State Flag,” Cleveland Council on World Affairs, digital image, accessed July 
13, 2016. http://www.ccwa.org/pocast-01/. 
141 Jamil Walli, “Analyzing ISIL’s Propaganda,” (master’s thesis, Linnaeus University, 2015), 
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:820361. 
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8. Step 8—Audience Reaction to Various Techniques 
Jowett and O’Donnell explain this area of analysis as examining “the behavior of 
the target audience…the audience’s adoption of the propagandist’s language, slogans, 
and attire…Over time, does the propaganda purpose become realized and part of the 
social scene?”142 The success of IS propaganda has already been discussed in previous 
sections, including the establishment of Brand Caliphate. The findings of the IS Twitter 
census, noted above, is further indication of the reaction by the target audience to the 
propaganda. Regardless of the brutality, or banality, of the material being published, IS 
appears to maintain a loyal following. This is observed in the estimated numbers of IS 
supporters remaining constant despite suffering massive losses. For example, in 
September 2014, the CIA estimated the number of IS fighters on the ground in Iraq and 
Syria at 20,000-31,500.143 Contrast this with Pentagon statements from January 2016, 
where estimates of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria remain between 20,000-30,000.144 These 
estimates are perhaps underwhelming until it is factored in that the Pentagon further 
estimates the U.S.-led coalition strikes have killed approximately 20,000 IS fighters.145 If 
accurate, this means that their recruitment is matching their losses. These numbers 
provide strong evidence to indicate Brand Caliphate has successfully marketed the IS 
brand. How much of these numbers reflect female recruitment remains vague. One 
anonymous U.S. intelligence official commented in February 2015 that the U.S. 
government does not “break things down by gender”; however, the number of women is 
“not insignificant.”146 
To obtain an approximate idea of the number of female recruits, in March 2016 
the think tank New America, led by journalist and author Peter Bergen, examined 604 
militants from 26 Western countries who—based on credible reporting—were believed to 
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have traveled to Iraq or Syria to fight with IS or similar Sunni jihadist groups. Their 
findings indicate women are “represented in unprecedented numbers,” with one in seven 
of their dataset identified as female. They further break down the numbers, indicating the 
average age for the full dataset is 25, whereas the average age for women is 22. Further, 
one-fifth of their sample is teenagers, “of whom more than a third are female.”147 More 
importantly for the purpose of analyzing the effects of propaganda, New America’s 
analysis found that over one-quarter of the data set had either been active on known 
online jihadist sites or are believed to have been radicalized due to their online 
interaction. Interestingly, the study does note that person-to-person recruitment remains 
active as well.148 
Not everyone agrees with the premise that the static numbers of fighters are a 
consequence of successful IS media campaign. Professor Cori Dauber of the University 
of North Carolina argues to the contrary, claiming we are establishing a cause-and-effect 
relationship when all we have established is a correlation. Dauber claims, without directly 
interviewing each recruit, that we cannot know with certainty their personal motivations. 
Dauber states: 
It is widely acknowledged that ISIS is enormously sophisticated in its use 
of Social Media. It is also widely acknowledged that they have had great 
success recruiting fighters from around the globe. The problem is that 
there has been a tendency to assume, with no evidence, that the two 
phenomena are linked, and to make further assumptions about how they 
are linked.149 
Although Dauber makes a valid point, she also fails to offer alternate explanations 
for the high recruitment numbers. Conceding the point that the effect of propaganda 
cannot be definitively identified as the culprit in IS’s successful recruitment, it remains 
the logical explanation. The analysis conducted in the following case examples indicates 
the effect of propaganda is more nuanced. 
147 Peter Bergen et al., “ISIS In The West: The Western Militant Flow to Syria and Iraq” (New 
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Erick Stakelbeck, in his book ISIS Exposed: Beheadings, Slavery and the Hellish 
Reality of Radical Islam, discusses the draw of Brand Caliphate. He cites as a point of 
reference the Rolling Stone August 2013 cover that features Boston Marathon bomber 
Dhokthar Tsarnaev. He explains it is the Western audience who doubled the regular sales 
of Rolling Stone’s Dhokthar issue that IS has successfully tapped into with their 
propaganda. Stakelbeck explains 
If you’re eager to give Islamic jihadists the rock star treatment for your 
impressionable young readers, it doesn’t get any more cutting edge than 
ISIS—masters of social media and thoroughly plugged into the Millennial 
generation. From severed heads rolling to Rolling Stone: a natural 
progression for ISIS in today’s morally depraved media climate…Memo 
to ISIS: jihadi cool sells here in what used to be known as Western 
civilization.150 
This draw to Brand Caliphate and “jihadi cool” is not limited to men. Women are 
also susceptible, although it may not be for all of the same reasons. Stakelbeck discusses 
this, describing the Caliphate drawing “the vulnerable, the impressionable, the lonely, the 
desperate, the troubled, the sinister, the violent, and the psychotic” as leaving Western 
societies to travel to the “valley of lost souls.” He explains that it is “men and women 
alike, who are drawn to the Islamic State’s audacious violence, dark vision, and online 
bravado as to a magnet.”151  
9. Step 9—Counterpropaganda 
In December 2013, the Department of State initiated its own social media 
campaign to counter the onslaught of online jihadist propaganda. Dubbed the “Think 
Again Turn Away” campaign, the project is run by the Center for Strategic and Counter 
Terrorism Communications digital outreach team.152 A campaign image is shown in 
Figure 5. Since June 2014, efforts have focused on counter-messaging toward IS and 
Brand Caliphate in social media. The Think Again Turn Away account on Twitter 
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engages individual Twitter users posting pro-IS rhetoric with links to anti-IS material and 
news stories. In March 2016, the Think Again Turn Away Tumblr account highlighted 
the IS assassination of 81-year-old Syrian archeologist and head of antiquities Khaled 
Assad, who refused to evacuate during the IS siege of the ancient city of Palmyra in an 
effort to protect the 2000-year-old artifacts. 
The campaign has been widely recognized as a failure. In September 2014, Time 
magazine reporter Rita Katz described the program as “ineffective” and argued the 
campaign actually “provides jihadists with a stage to voice their arguments—regularly 
engaging in petty disputes with fighters and supporters of groups like IS…arguing over 
who had killed more people while exchanging sarcastic quips.”153 The New York Times 
echoed this assertion more recently in a June 2015 report, labeling the Obama 
administration’s efforts against the IS “message machine” as “dismal.”154 The State 
Department stands by the program, labeling their counter-messaging a “pillar of the 
strategy to defeat the group;” however, Obama administration officials acknowledge IS is 
more “nimble” at spreading their message.155 
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Figure 5.  “Teddy Bear”156 
In May 2016, the Global Engagement Center was created to take over the efforts 
of the State Department. Reporting from July 2016 indicates the U.S. government is 
becoming more effective at controlling the narrative, with significant results. In the last 
two years, Twitter traffic attributed to IS-linked accounts has been reduced by 45 
percent.157 This drop has been attributed to the refinement of government techniques, 
including messaging in Arabic instead of English, and using the Muslim community to 
disseminate the messaging.158 Research by the Associated Press indicates pro-ISIS 
Twitter account followers have dropped from an average of 1500 followers in 2014 to 
156 Source: Department of State, Global Engagement Program, “Teddy Bear,” Associated Press, 
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just 300 in 2016.159 Although there appears to be significant progress in controlling the 
narrative, U.S. government efforts have focused on Twitter, and the possibility exists that 
the bulk of online communication has moved to other social media applications, 
including encrypted applications. 
10. Step 10—Effects and Evaluation
Jowett and O’Donnell identify the most important consideration when evaluating 
propaganda as whether “the purpose of the propaganda has been fulfilled.”160 They 
further clarify that when determining the effectiveness of the propaganda, the evaluator 
should consider both “the achievement of goals but also the means through which the 
goals were adopted.”161  
Using this 10-step model, it can be argued that IS does in fact have targeted 
messaging toward females. This appears to be a smaller portion of the larger IS Brand 
Caliphate marketing machine. In the next chapter, this thesis examines several cases of 
female recruitment in an effort to determine if Brand Caliphate’s targeted messaging 
toward women played a role in their radicalization. 
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V. CASE EXAMPLES 
As previously noted, University of North Carolina professor Cori Dauber cautions 
against assigning a cause-and-effect relationship between propaganda and radicalization, 
arguing we cannot declare the relationship with certainty without direct feedback from 
the radicalized individual.162 In this section, I will examine six cases of women who 
radicalized in support of IS. The cases have been selected based on the availability of 
material providing insight to their exposure to propaganda, and the effect it had on them. 
Having taken an analytical look at the propaganda itself in the previous section, this 
section will now examine the effects this propaganda has had on select females, as well 
as propaganda being dispersed by females in support of IS. Having established that IS 
does have targeted messaging toward females, these cases will be examined to determine 
if this messaging ever reaches the intended audience of potential female recruits, and if 
so, what effect it has on them. Does this targeted propaganda account for the numbers of 
females radicalized in support of IS? 
162 Dauber, “ISIS and the Family Man.” 
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A. AQSA MAHMOOD—THE TRAILBLAZER 
Figure 6.  Aqsa Mahmood163 
Aqsa Mahmood’s story and radicalization took place during the infancy of Brand 
Caliphate, thereby reducing her exposure to the propaganda machine and any messaging 
targeting females. What makes her story unique is her later contribution to the creation of 
that targeted messaging. After being radicalized and having traveled to Syria, Mahmood 
became a popular trailblazer for other females teetering toward radicalization. Her 
personal experience and her willingness to put her personal story into the greater 
narrative through her blog gave her credibility among females considering joining IS. 
Aqsa Mahmood is often considered the pioneer of radicalized female IS 
supporters. Her story begins in the 1970s, when her father left Pakistan for Glasgow to 
become the first Pakistani cricket player in Scotland.164 He settled with his wife in an 
upper middle-class neighborhood and sent their children to private school. Aqsa enjoyed 
high school, listened to the music of Coldplay, and read Harry Potter and the Hunger 
163 Source: Handout Photo, “Aqsa Mahmood,” Business Insider, digital image, accessed July 13, 
2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-alabama-woman-joins-islamic-state-in-syria-media-2015-4. 
164 Ashley Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter,” CNN. February 24, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/23/world/scottish-teen-isis-recruiter/. 
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Games.165 She was an average teenage girl, studying diagnostic radiography at Glasgow 
Caledonian University before joining IS. Aqsa traveled to Syria in November 2013, prior 
to the declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014 and before Brand Caliphate became 
trendy. Reports indicate that she was married to a jihadi fighter soon after her arrival in 
Syria.166 Aqsa’s family claims she became a “bedroom radical” who was ultimately 
radicalized through her online activity, including watching sermons and contacts through 
social media.167 They also blame her online relationship with English-based fanatic 
Adeel Ulhaq for exposing their daughter to radical ideology.168 
Investigation after her departure indicates Aqsa was active on radical Muslim chat 
forums, spending increasing amounts of time in her bedroom at home radicalizing online 
and limiting her socialization in the community. Aqsa was described by her family as 
deeply disturbed by the increasing conflict in Syria, and expressed a desire to assist in 
some way, although her radicalization came as a surprise to them.169 
Aqsa created a Tumblr blog in the spring of 2013, prior to her departure to 
Syria.170 The blog, titled “Diary of a Muhajirah” went viral in the jihadi community.171 
This, in combination with her Twitter and Facebook accounts, became the social media 
platforms Aqsa used to voice threats against the West and to encourage others to join the 
cause. Her early presence and her actions served to elevate her as a source of propaganda 
for other potential female recruits.172 Contents of her blog include various types of pro-IS 
165 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter.” 
166 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter.” 
167 Atika Shubert and Bharati Naik, “How a Glasgow Girl Became an ISIS Bride,” CNN, September 
5, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/isis-bride-glasgow-scotland/. 
168 Gavin Madley, “Parents of Scottish Jihadi Bride Aqsa Mahmood Tell of Devastation,” Mail, 
February 21, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3457741/Heartbroken-hopeless-Parents-
Scottish-jihadi-bride-Aqsa-Mahmood-tell-devastation-losing-ISIS-brainwashing.html; in February 2016, 
after they assisted a colleague travel to Syria with the intent to possibly follow him later, Abdeel Ulhaq and 
two associates were convicted of helping in the preparation of an act of terrorism. 
169 “Aqsa Mahmood: How Did Scot Become Jihadi Bride in Syria?,” Week News, accessed June 3, 
2016, http://www.theweek.co.uk/people/islamic-state/60274/aqsa-mahmood-how-did-scot-become-jihadi-
bride-in-syria. 
170 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter.” 
171 Agron, “Online Women Activists of the Islamic State—Where Are They Now?” 
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propaganda, ranging from anti-Bashar al-Assad material to pictures of jihadist fighters, 
and even photographs of wounded children.173 Most of her blog posts are followed by 
numerous entries of her supporters “liking” her posts, and many reposts of her entries.174 
A snapshot of her Tumblr page is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7.  Aqsa Mahmood’s Tumblr Page175 
Many of her entries espouse hatred of the West. However, the posts that seem to 
resonate the most with other females are the ones in which she appears to speak frankly 
about the sacrifice of leaving your family in support of the cause. She warns recruits that 
leaving the safety of your family is difficult, claiming, “The family you get in exchange 
for leaving the ones behind are like the pearl in comparison to the shell you threw away 
into the foam of the sea.”176 She admits the first phone call you make to your family once 
you arrive in Syria is the most difficult thing you will ever do, leaving you feeling “cold 
173 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter.” 
174 Ibid. 
175 Source: Aqsa Mahmood, “Aqsa Mahmood’s Tumblr Page,” BuzzFeed, digital image, September 
11, 2014. https://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/inside-the-online-world-of-the-women-of-
isis?utm_term=.xvgJ2xJ3r#.fo3DL5DnN. 
176 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter,” 
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hearted.” Nevertheless, she justifies the experience, asserting, “as long as you are firm 
and you know that this is all for the sake of Allah then nothing can shake you.”177 
Aqsa’s prominence online and recognition as a recruiter ultimately resulted in her 
being blamed for the radicalization of three British girls—referred to as the Bethnal 
Green schoolgirls—Shamima Begum, Amira Abase, and Kadize Sultana, who traveled to 
Syria in February 2015.178 Aqsa’s parents claim Aqsa did not assist the girls, and she 
denied even knowing their identities.179 Press reporting at the time indicated Shamima 
Begum attempted to communicate with Aqsa via Twitter prior to their departure; 
however, Aqsa told her parents that she did not respond to Begum.180 Regardless of 
whether she had direct contact with the Bethnal Green girls or not, the fact that one of 
them solicited contact with Aqsa indicates the influence she had on them. Personal 
contact was not necessary, Aqsa’s propaganda—her message, conveyed through her 
blog—was sufficient to serve as a factor in the girls’ decision to radicalize and travel to 
Syria. 
Aqsa’s blog is a metaphor for IS propaganda, wavering between angry anti-
Western threats and thoughtful family commentary. On September 11, 2014, Aqsa 
allegedly posted: 
Know this Cameron/Obama, you and your countries will be beneath our 
feet and your Kufr will be destroyed, this is a promise from Allah swt that 
we have no doubt over. If not you then your grandchildren or their 
grandchildren.181 
On the same date, Aqsa allegedly also posted: 
The media at first used to claim that the ones running away to joining the 
Jihad as being unsuccessful, didn’t have a future and from broke down 
families, etc. But that is far from the truth. Most sisters I have come across 
177 Fantz, “The Story of a Scottish Girl Turned ISIS Recruiter.” 
178 Leslie Burt, “Aqsa Mahmood,” Counter Jihad Report, March 4, 2015, 
https://counterjihadreport.com/tag/aqsa-mahmood/. 
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have been in university studying courses with many promising paths, with 
big, happy families and friends and everything. If we had stayed behind, 
we could have been blessed with it all from a relaxing and comfortable life 
and lots of money.182 
Interestingly, despite Aqsa’s elevated status as a female Jihadi in the Caliphate 
and her viral following online, she does not appear to have posted to her blog since 
summer 2015.183 It is unknown if something has happened to Aqsa, or if her silence is 
indicative of a different strategy for IS propaganda. Regardless, her role as a trailblazer 
for potential female recruits remains immortalized online in her original targeted 
messaging. 
B. HODA MUTHANA—THE PUPIL BECOMES THE MASTER 
 
Figure 8.  Hoda Muthana184 
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The following case example details the story of Hoda Muthana. Muthana provides 
a unique and perhaps surprising perspective on the effect of Brand Caliphate. Born and 
raised in the United States in a Muslim household, Muthana did not appear to be swayed 
by the violence contained in much of the IS propaganda. After becoming fully radicalized 
and traveling to Syria, Muthana has herself become a source of propaganda; however, 
instead of messaging about “raising her cubs” in the Caliphate, Muthana has been 
outspoken in advocating violence in the United States. Eschewing more traditional 
female roles within Brand Caliphate, Muthana is a story of radicalization that neither 
responded to the targeted propaganda toward women nor does her fully radicalized voice 
contribute to targeted messaging of women. Instead, she now contributes to the larger 
Brand Caliphate propaganda machine. 
In the early-1990s, Mohammed Muthana and his wife fled from Yemen to the 
United States where they became naturalized citizens and watched from afar as their 
country was torn apart by civil war.185 Their youngest daughter, Hoda, was born in the 
United States, graduating from high school in Hoover, Alabama, where those who knew 
her described her as quiet, kind, and reserved.186 After graduation, Hoda attended the 
University of Alabama, studying business, until November 2014 when she deceived her 
family and fled to Syria to join IS.187 
In an online interview conducted by BuzzFeed News Organization with Hoda 
after her arrival in Syria, she explained how she secretly obtained the money for her 
travel by enrolling for her college courses using her parents’ money, and then 
immediately withdrawing from the classes. She then used the refunded tuition enrollment 
to fund her trip to the Caliphate. Hoda completed the deception by telling her father she 
185 Ellie Hall, “Gone Girl: An Interview with an American in ISIS,” BuzzFeed, April 17, 2015, 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/gone-girl-an-interview-with-an-american-in-
isis?utm_term=.fqEewVezx#.eoEW34Wm7. 
186 Jon Anderson, “Hoover Woman Joins ISIS: Meet Hoda Muthana Who Fled U.S. to Syria,” 
AL.com, April 21, 2015, http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/04/
meet_hoda_muthana_the_quiet_gi.html. 
187 “Hoda Muthana,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed June 2, 2016, 
http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/hoda-muthana. 
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was going on a school trip to Atlanta, and instead traveled to Syria and joined IS. Hoda 
admits IS members she met online she assisted in the logistics of her travel.188 
Perhaps ironically, both Hoda and Mohammed agree that Mohammed was a strict 
parent. He did not allow his children to have a cell phone while in high school, gifting 
them one upon their graduation. By both accounts, it was this device that ultimately led to 
Hoda’s radicalization. Mohammed details his regular review of Hoda’s phone, finding 
only indications she had been studying Islam and become more devout—a source of 
pride for Mohammed, who is deeply religious. However, what he failed to notice were 
the radical videos Hoda was watching on YouTube and her secret Twitter account in 
which she began communication with IS followers, gaining a large following herself for 
her increasingly radical comments.189 
An associate of Hoda from the Hoover Muslim community had access to her 
online activities and watched as Hoda’s tenor became more extreme. With regard to 
Hoda’s travel and support of IS, the associate stated, “I just kind of expected it from her,” 
even if her parents did not.190 Hoda herself discussed her growing allegiance toward IS 
and her self-imposed isolation: “I literally isolated myself from all my friends and 
community members the last year I was in America,” she said, explaining that she did not 
want to associate with anyone who did not share her interpretation of Islam, an 
interpretation that she said demanded every Muslim move to ISIS-controlled territory. 
“As I grew closer to my deen, I lost all of my friends, I found none in my community that 
desired to tread the path I was striving for.”191 
Mohammed sees this as the time IS radicalized his daughter, “I believe she [sic] 
been brainwashed…She’s not that kind of girl. They brainwashed her.”192 Hoda’s family 
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believed she was radicalized online over a period of approximately one year.193 Hoda did 
not specify the precise propaganda she was exposed to beyond admitting to watching 
YouTube videos and using social media, including her secret account on Twitter. Through 
this Twitter account Hoda met and communicated with known IS members, including Aqsa 
Mahmood, who previously left her home country of Scotland to travel to Syria in support 
of IS.194 Aqsa Mahmood is widely recognized as a female recruiter for IS.195 
Approximately one month after her arrival in Syria, Hoda was married to 
Australian IS fighter Suhan Abdul Rahman, who went by Abu Jihad al-Australi, leading 
Hoda to adopt the moniker Umm Jihad.196 Hoda denied being forced to marry, and 
instead fully immersed herself in the ways of IS, becoming a propagandist herself.197 In 
March 2015, Hoda Tweeted an image of Abu Jihad’s corpse on the battlefield and stated, 
“May Allah accept my husband, Abu Jihad al-Australi. Promised Allah and fought in the 
front lines until he obtained shahadah…And never think of those who have been killed in 
the cause of Allah as dead.”198 Reports from Syria soon after indicate Hoda continued to 
offer unwavering support to IS, joining the Al-Khansaa Brigade and becoming prolific on 
Twitter, espousing anti-U.S. sentiment and encouraging violence toward the West. A 
snapshot of one of her Tweets is shown in Figure 9. Her Tweets included threats toward 
President Obama and requests for funds to assist IS.  
193 “Alabama Woman Joins Islamic State in Syria: Media,” Reuters, accessed June 2, 2016, 
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Figure 9.  Hoda Muthana’s Tweet199 
Whatever propaganda Hoda was exposed to online was significant and powerful 
enough to change her from a “kind” high school student to a bloodthirsty advocate of IS. 
As the cycle of propaganda and radicalization continues, Hoda has now become the 
purveyor of the propaganda. Who better to speak to the life of a female in Syria than a 
female in Syria? Who better to judge Muslim females for not traveling in support of the 
Caliphate than a female who did? Hoda’s actions and her gender lend her voice and her 
pro-IS message credibility. Much as Aqsa Mahmood’s did before her. 
                                                 




C. JAELYN DELSHAUN YOUNG—THE SELECTIVE BELIEVER 
Figure 10.  Jaelyn Delshaun Young200 
Examining the story of Jaelyn Delshaun Young reveals a young and 
impressionable female who was clearly seeking and open to the propaganda available 
regarding IS. In this case, Young was exposed to both sides of the messaging, those by 
Brand Caliphate, which she chose to accept, and those providing an anti-IS narrative, 
which she chose to discount. Young appeared to absorb the material that fit into the 
narrative of IS she had created for herself and reject any propaganda or information that 
provided a contrary story line, such as news reports of IS atrocities. This perception by 
Young of skewed reporting against IS served to motivate her to right the perceived 
wrong, and ultimately fueled the process of her radicalization, providing a righteous 
motivation. 
In August 2015, Jaelyn Young and her fiancé, Muhammad Dakhlalla, were 
charged with providing material support to terrorists when they attempted to travel to 
Syria in support of IS. Young was 19 years old at the time of her arrest, the daughter of a 
police officer in the Vicksburg, Mississippi, police department and a school 
administrator. Young graduated from her high school with honors; she was a cheerleader 
200 Source: Associated Press, “Jaelyn Delshaun Young,” New York Post, digital image, 2012. 
http://nypost.com/2015/08/11/young-mississippi-couple-charged-with-attempting-to-join-isis/. 
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and a member of the homecoming court. She was attending Mississippi State University 
as a chemistry major at the time of her arrest.201 
Reports indicate that Young, raised in a Christian household, was already 
considering converting to Islam when she met Dakhlalla, who is from a prominent family 
in the local Muslim community.202 The two began dating in November 2014 and by 
March 2015, Young had announced her conversion and began to wear a burqa in 
public.203 Dakhlalla reports that after her conversion, Young began to distance herself 
from non-Muslims, including her family and friends, believing that “spending time with 
non-Muslims would be a bad influence.”204 
It was after her conversion and her self-imposed isolation that Young began to 
delve into IS propaganda. Dakhlalla claims Young began watching YouTube videos 
about Islamic law, pro-IS videos, and videos of radical pro-IS cleric Anjem Choudary.205 
Soon after, Young began to express distaste for the way Muslims are treated in Britain 
and the United States and to express hatred toward those she deemed “immoral.”206 This 
was demonstrated when Young expressed support of IS after watching a video of a 
Muslim being thrown from a building to his death for alleged homosexuality.207 
Dakhlalla was recorded in criminal proceedings as explaining: 
After watching pro-ISIL videos on a regular basis, Dakhlalla and Young 
felt that the U.S. media was presenting a biased picture and refusing to 
acknowledge the good they thought that ISIL was doing in some parts of 
the world. Dakhlalla and Young were bothered greatly by the coverage of 
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ISIL in Western media, in light of the fact that the couple viewed ISIL as 
liberators of areas of Syria and Iraq.208 
Young appeared to be actively seeking out IS propaganda and was not deterred by 
the violence contained within. It does not appear that Young was either exposed to or 
sought out any differentiated propaganda based on her gender. Reporting by her partner, 
Dakhlalla, indicates Young researched pro-IS videos and provided her own justifications 
to the violence she witnessed there. However, there is evidence to indicate Young 
experienced some potential gender-based bias through her exposure, and she simply 
chose to discount the information as not being factual. For example, in an online 
conversation with an undercover FBI agent in June 2015, Young stated with regard to 
Dakhlalla’s intentions upon arriving in the Caliphate: 
He wants to help with the media group and really wants to correct the 
falsehoods heard here. U.S. has a thick cloud of falsehood and very little 
truth about Dawlah makes it through and if it does then usually the links 
are deleted (like on youtube and stuff). Dakhlalla says a lot of Muslims are 
caught in their doubts of IS bc of what U.S. media says and he wants to 
assure them the U.S. media is all lies when regarding Dawlah. After he 
sees change in that, he wanted to join the Mujahideen.209 
When exposed to Brand Caliphate, Young appeared to simply categorize the 
material into the items she could justify and accept, identifying them as reality; or the 
items she could not find palatable, labeling them as a misinformation campaign by the 
U.S. government. Through continued exposure, Young’s tolerance for violence and 
ability to accept and even celebrate IS violence increased, with her expressing excitement 
over the news of the July 2015 attack in Tennessee by IS supporter Muhammad 
Abdulazeez in which five service members were murdered. 
In another conversation, Young summarily dismisses the idea that sex slavery is 
permitted in the Caliphate, stating, “the kuffs are reporting that IS has a sex slave trade 
business for girls as young as 1–9 years old…these ppl believe it too. I can not wait to be 
in Dawlah. These likes are so toxic, I am getting very angry at them for believing such 
208 United States v. Muhammad Oda Dakhlalla. 
209 Ibid. 
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stupidity.”210 Rather than acknowledge the potential of her travel to Syria being 
something other than her expectations, Young falsely identified contrary information as 
part of a larger counter-propaganda campaign. 
Although both Young and Dakhlalla describe Young as the mastermind of the 
plan to travel to Syria, it remains unclear how much of an effect Young’s relationship 
with Dakhlalla influenced her radicalization, and vice versa. The possibility exists that 
the effect of the propaganda was amplified when applied to more than one person at a 
time, allowing each recipient to validate the material to the other, and discouraging any 
natural skepticism. What does appear to be indisputable is that exposure to the 
propaganda helped shape the version of Islam Young chose to pursue. In this particular 
case study, the potential recruit was exposed to competing narratives, or propaganda, and 
chose to discount the material that challenged her hermeneutics. Instead, Young filtered 
the anti-IS material she was exposed to in such a way to justify her belief system by 
deeming it lacking in credibility. 
D. SHANNON MAUREEN CONLEY—THE BRIDE 
Figure 11.  Shannon Maureen Conley211 
210 “Jaelyn Young Criminal Complaint.” 
211 Source: Arvada West High School, “Shannon Conley Yearbook Photo,” CPR, digital image, 
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Shannon Maureen Conley is a case of a mentally ill female who sought 
information online. Although there is no documentation indicating she was ever directly 
exposed to Brand Caliphate’s targeted messaging toward females, there is information 
that she was affected by the broader messaging of the Caliphate as a victim. Further, 
depicted as socially awkward, Conley seemed motivated by the romance of becoming a 
jihadi bride. Conley’s unhealthy commitment to her online boyfriend, combined by her 
mental illness, led her to make increasingly poor decisions toward radicalization despite 
the intervention of law enforcement. 
In September 2014, 19-year-old Shannon Conley, a trained nurse’s aide from 
Arvada, Colorado, appeared in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado and 
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign 
terrorist organization.212 How does a teenager in Colorado go from a Christian suburban 
nurse’s aide to wanting to become a radical Muslim convert, hoping to assist with jihad? 
Authorities reportedly became aware of Conley in November 2013, when she was 
seen wandering around and taking notes about the layout of the Faith Bible Chapel 
campus in Arvada. Employees became concerned when they saw Conley’s actions.213 
The church was the site of a 2007 incident where Matthew J. Murray killed two people 
and wounded three others before being killed by a security staff member.214 After the 
November incident, Conley was interviewed by the Joint Terrorism Task Force and 
reportedly stated, “If they think I’m a terrorist, I’ll give them something to think I am.”215 
FBI agents continued to speak with Conley over the following months, attempting to 
direct her toward humanitarian work and encouraging her parents to talk to Conley about 
212 George Holloway, “Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to Sentencing” (U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado, September 10, 2014) 1:14-cr-00163-RM, https://www.justice.gov/iso/
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more moderate beliefs.216 During these conversations, Conley admitted her conversion to 
Islam and her online radicalization.217 She described her conversion to Islam as occurring 
after researching the religion online, speaking with ISIS recruiters, and experiencing 
strong emotions about the mistreatment of Muslims globally.218 
During her online conversion, Conley met 32-year-old Yousr Mouelhi.219 In early 
2014, Conley told her father she had a new boyfriend, and arranged a Skype conversation 
between them. Reportedly, during the web chat, Mouelhi and Conley requested her 
father’s blessing to marry. Then they advised him that Conley “would be moving to 
Syria, where they would wed and spend their lives together. Their lives, they told him, 
would be dedicated to ISIS.”220 
During their online conversations, the pair came to recognize that they shared, “a 
view of Islam as requiring participation in violent jihad against any non-believers.”221 
Conley agreed to travel to Syria and marry Mouelhi after receiving training in the United 
States that would assist them in their jihad.222 To accomplish this, on September 7, 2013, 
Conley joined the U.S. Army Explorers with the intent of obtaining training in firearms 
and U.S. military tactics.223 
Conley’s father refused to allow her to marry Mouelhi. He eventually found a 
one-way airline ticket to Turkey in his daughter’s name.224 On April 8, 2014, Conley was 
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arrested at Denver International Airport as she attempted to fly to Turkey to meet with 
Mouelhi. Found in her possession at the time was a list of phone number that included 
Mouelhi, as well as documents verifying her U.S. Army Explorers certification, first aid/
nursing certifications, a certification from the National Rifle Association, and a field first-
aid manual.225 A subsequent search of Conley’s residence resulted in the discovery of 
recordings of Anwar al-Awlaki: books, articles, and propaganda for al-Qaida, IS, and 
jihad, as well as used, labeled firing targets.226 
Conley may exhibit some outsider traits, having had her mental health called into 
question during her court proceedings. The U.S. district judge presiding over her case 
described her as “in need of psychiatric help…a bit of a mess…it doesn’t seem like she 
gets it.”227 The prosecuting assistant U.S. attorney described Conley as “pathologically 
naïve.”228 At her sentencing, Conley still seemed unable to grasp the gravity of her 
situation and the violence associated with IS. Crying as she read her written statement, 
Conley stated, “Even though I supported a jihad, it was never to hurt anyone. It was 
always in defense of Muslims.”229 It is unclear how, exactly, Conley intended to act in 
support of jihad, while not inflicting harm. 
Conley displays an example of a mentally ill young female who is easily 
manipulated by the broader Brand Caliphate propaganda, as well as the one-on-one 
interactions with her IS online boyfriend. The two-pronged factors of radicalization—the 
effect of Brand Caliphate propaganda combined with direct, interpersonal online 
engagement with a female recruit—is not unique. We see a similar scenario with Alex, 
the lonely Sunday school teacher. 
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E. ALEX—THE LONELY SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHER 
Figure 12.  Alex230 
Alex, like Shannon Conley, led a socially isolated existence. Her exposure to IS 
came from curiosity and her self-prompted inquiries. Although there is no proof that she 
was ever directly exposed to IS propaganda or Brand Caliphate’s targeted messaging, she 
did appear motivated in her exploration by the broader, jihadi-cool concept formulated by 
Brand Caliphate. Her recruitment was then accelerated by her online social interactions 
and her deep desire to belong. 
In June 2015, New York Times reporter and seasoned IS journalist Rukmini 
Callimachi published an article containing the exclusive story of a young woman in rural 
Washington State who was lured by the appeal of Brand Caliphate. Callimachi’s story, 
titled, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” tells the story of “Alex,” a 23-year-old 
Christian Sunday school teacher and babysitter who lived with her grandparents.231 
Callimachi came to know about Alex and her story from a tip from an online 
activist.232 After contacting Alex and her grandmother, an agreement was made to tell 
230 Andrea Bruce, “Alex,” New York Times, Digital image, June 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
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Alex’s story, on the condition that efforts would be made to protect their identities, 
although all parties understood the likely futility of the effort.233 
Alex admits to suffering from loneliness in her rural community. She suffers from 
hand tremors and a “persistent lack of maturity and poor judgment” likely due to fetal 
alcohol syndrome. Her mother lost custody of her to her grandparents when she was 11 
months old. Her grandmother described Alex as a “lost child” after she dropped out of 
college and spent most of her ample free time streaming movies and trolling the internet 
and her social media accounts.234 
In August 2014, a seemingly unrelated event sent a series of events into motion. 
Alex learned of the beheading of journalist James Foley by IS. Moved by a sense of 
“horrified curiosity,” she began researching the group, trying to understand the reason for 
their actions. What Alex found online surprised her—a group of online personas who 
politely responded to her inquiries. She developed rapport with the people she 
encountered, and spoke with them regularly to keep her loneliness at bay. The more 
questions she asked about their cause, the more they systemically exposed her to 
Islam.235 As Callimachi astutely points out, this technique closely follows the advice 
given in the al Qaida recruitment manual, believed to have been adopted by IS.236 
As Alex thought about Islam and what she saw in press reporting about IS, she 
decided she realized that “what people were saying about them wasn’t true.”237 As she 
struggled to reconcile the information about God she was receiving from her new online 
friends with that she had always known in her church, her online IS mentor, Monzer 
Hamad, told her, “What you do not know is that I am not inviting you to leave 
Christianity. Islam is the correction of Christianity.”238 Soon after, Alex told Hamad, “I 
233 Teng, “Friends with ISIS: How to Tell One Young Woman’s Story.” 
234 Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American.” 
235 Ibid. 
236 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.” 
237 Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American.” 
238 Ibid. 
74 
can agree that Muhammad and Jesus are prophets and not God,” to which he responded, 
“So what are you waiting for to become a Muslim?”239 
In the ensuing months, Alex received gifts from her new, pro-IS online friends, 
including books on Islam. She made new pro-IS friends, and began to Skype regularly 
with a man who identified himself as Faisal Mostafa, an IS supporter living in England. 
They began to spend up to six hours a day talking on Skype, with the cameras turned off 
to protect her feminine modesty. Their conversations remained platonic, as he tutored her 
in the ways of Islam, eventually leading her to her secret conversation, occurring days 
after Christmas, as she completed her declaration of faith, or Shahada, on Twitter, so her 
new online friends could serve as her witnesses.240 
By the end of January 2015, Alex was leading a double life. Around her family, 
she tried to act the same as she always had to limit any suspicions. But when alone 
or online, she wore the hijab, prayed on the prayer mat, and read the book on Caliph 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that Mostafa had mailed to her.241 
Eventually Mostafa found a husband for Alex, describing the man as older and 
unattractive, but a “nice muslim.”242 He began to pressure Alex, telling her it is 
considered a sin for a Muslim to remain with nonbelievers. Mostafa directed Alex to use 
her little brother, then 11 years old, as her mahram, and travel to Austria, where she 
would meet her future husband.243 
Alex’s plans ended due to her grandmother becoming concerned and taking 
action. She confiscated Alex’s internet devices and contacted Mostafa online, who 
claimed his efforts to bring Alex overseas and marry her were a joke. He promised Alex’s 
grandmother he would not communicate with her anymore. Alex’s grandmother 







resolved, Alex’s grandparents went on vacation. Alex logged back on to Skype, and 
contacted Mostafa. At the time of the article, the two were still secretly 
communicating.244 
Callimachi’s story of Alex highlights the ease and anonymity involved in 
recruitment, and the ability for Brand Caliphate to bypass concerned family members and 
establish almost intimate relationships with potential recruits. This all occurs in the 
privacy of their online world, from the comfort of their bedroom. When discussing this 
story and the phenomenon of radicalized young women via Brand Caliphate, 
Callimachi states: 
Their (IS) propaganda machine is so rich. You can find a step-by-step 
curriculum that takes you ever closer to this extreme ideology. And you 
can do this in the privacy of your own bedroom in rural Washington with 
your family watching Fox News in the other bedroom…with no one 
knowing until you are almost too far down that road.245 
Another key aspect Callimachi’s story showcase is the factor of social isolation 
with regard to recruitment. Alex had very few friends and close relationships, no one to 
guide her toward a course correction. The one time she did reach out to someone, the 
pastor in her local congregation, she was summarily blown off and sent on her way—
reinforcing her isolation and doubt about Christianity.246 
New York magazine reporter Jesse Singal captured this concept in a reflection of 
Callimachi’s article: 
What’s striking about this unusual story is just how normal so much of it 
is. A subset of young people always have and always will feel adrift or 
lonely or stranded or lacking a purpose. In this case, ISIS was, from its 
own point of view, in the right place at the right time to give Alex both the 
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sense of connection to a social network and a larger sense of purpose that 
she desperately craved.247 
For an awkward and isolated girl in rural Washington State, this social interaction, 
simple kindnesses and having someone spend time with her, was enough to convince her 
to abandon her religion, deceive her family, and nearly sacrifice the existence of her and 
her juvenile brother. Even after the curtain has been pulled back and her interactions with 
IS have been laid bare to her, Alex cannot help herself and continues to feel drawn to the 
contact. This draw likely goes beyond the effects of Brand Caliphate and speaks to a 
much larger, psychological pull and motivation to belong. 
F. THE DENVER 3 
The three minor females from Denver who attempted, over a period of several 
months, to deceive their families and travel to Syria, is a stark example of the overall 
effect of Brand Caliphate. No information can be found to indicate they were exposed to 
targeted messaging toward women; however, it is clear by their messaging on their ghost 
accounts that they were exposed to and affected by the broader messaging of Brand 
Caliphate. And again, we discover an example of thwarted recruitment that leaves the 
potential recruit unconvinced that their failure to join IS is the desired outcome. In the 
case of the Denver 3, the girls were not socially isolated and desiring group acceptance. 
In fact, it remains unknown why their initial interest was generated.  
On October 17, 2014, Umm Yassir, 16, and her friends, who were sisters, Umm 
Sufyan, 17, and Umm Suleiman, 15, departed Denver with the intent to join IS in 
Syria.248 Earlier that morning, Umm Sufyan and Umm Suleiman, of Somali descent, told 
their father they were not feeling well and were going to stay home from school. Later, 
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they contacted him at his place of employment and told him they were going to go to the 
library. When he returned home that night from work, they were not there.249 
On the same date, Umm Yassir, of Sudanese descent, left her house at 0630. Her 
father believed she was meeting the school bus, as she did all school mornings. Later that 
morning he received a call from the school saying Umm Yassir was not in class. He 
contacted her on her cell phone, and she told him she had just been running late for class. 
She was not home when he returned.250 
Umm Yassir’s father became concerned, even more so when he realized her 
passport was missing. After contacting Umm Sufyan and Umm Suleiman’s father, it 
was determined that their passports were also missing, along with $2000 in cash 
from their home.251 The fathers, fearing the worst, contacted local law enforcement, 
with the information eventually reaching the FBI, who put an international 
notice on their passports.252 All three girls were stopped in Frankfurt International 
Airport by German authorities as they attempted to board a flight to Turkey.253 
The girls were briefly detained before being returned to their homes in Denver.254 
Their families were described as “shocked” by their behavior, claiming all three 
girls had never caused any trouble.255 However, it appears the girls’ friends and 
associates at school were not surprised, and reported to school officials that morning 
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Tweets the three had made indicating their intentions.256 A spokesperson for the Cherry 
Creek School District, where the girls attended school, explained the belief that the girls 
were “victims of online predators,” explaining: 
Our understanding, our belief is that they were recruited online. That’s our 
belief based on information we have from various sources, including 
investigators…In most of these cases like this, it’s not so much they want 
to fight with ISIS. They are promised they will have homes, be safe, have 
husbands and live within their religion.257 
Other teenage friends of the girls reported after the fact that they noticed changes 
in their behavior, transforming from “carefree westernized high-schoolers” to so devoted 
to their religion that they isolated themselves from their friends and normal teenage 
interests.258 
Officials familiar with the case relayed to reporters the belief that Umm Sufyan 
was the instigator, spending as long as two months online planning the trip; however, her 
research failed to trigger any law enforcement tripwires.259 What would have certainly 
provided insight to the girls’ intentions are their social media accounts. All of the girls 
were active on Twitter, with Umm Sufyan creating a second, secret shadow account with 
the handle of @CarrierOfSins, which she used for most of her communication.260 Umm 
Suleiman followed her sister’s lead, also creating a second, shadow account with the 
handle of “@_SlaveOfAllah_.261 Umm Yassir used her own account, which seemed to 
indicate she was in communication with an account linked to an IS operative, Abu 
Aminah.262 Umm Suleiman was similarly known to be in communication with a female 
IS operative, Umm Waqqas.263 Umm Sufyan created a Tumblr page that contained 
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hundreds of pro-IS posts, including reposts of blogs written by women who had 
previously been recruited to the Caliphate; see Figure 13.264 
Figure 13.  Umm Sufyan’s Tumblr Page265 
The girls remained apparently unaware of their permanent footprint online. After 
their return home from Frankfurt, Umm Sufyan and Umm Suleiman were interviewed by 
local police. They admitted their travel but refused to provide any further information, 
perhaps under the impression that the motive remained hidden. When questioned about 
their travel, the sisters advised simply that they traveled to Germany for “family” and 
refused to elaborate.266 
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A review over time of the girls’ Twitter accounts depicts a slow and steady 
growing intensity and religiosity in their posts. As early as June 2014, Umm Yassir 
posted a message indicating her extreme leanings, stating, “Those who identify as ‘gay’ 
and ‘Muslim’ at the same time deserve death,” followed by, “Muslims handing out 
apologies because of 9/11 are a disgrace to the Ummah.”267 By July 2014, the girls 
expressed increasing frustration with their family and friends, with Umm Yassir 
Tweeting, “Unsupportive parents are such a roadblock.”268 In September 2014, a month 
before their attempted departure, Umm Sufyan cryptically Tweeted, “when I die and if 
you guys hear of my death, it would be so much better for me if you guys made sincere 
dua for me than to tweet about me.”269 During the same timeframe, her sister, Umm 
Suleiman Tweeted, “My whole life has been a lie.”270 The day prior to their departure, 
Umm Suleiman remarked via Twitter, “I started to notice the people I called ‘friends’ 
weren’t my true friends.”271 
Little is known about the girls since their return to Colorado. Press reporting 
indicates the girls’ fathers received mixed feedback on social media for their actions and 
reporting their disappearance to the authorities. Some laud their proactive response, 
claiming their actions saved the lives of the teens. Others, more in line with the pro-IS 
ideology, believe the fathers showed themselves to be disloyal to the great cause, and 
aligned with the enemy, the United States.272  
The girls received similar mixed feedback in social media.273 Although all three 
have remained quiet about their experience and motivations since their return, a friend of 
Umm Suleiman posted and then deleted a Facebook message she claimed was from her. 
The post stated: 








To everyone who backbited [sic] about me I thank you because you guys 
took my sins. And all the reasons you guys think we left couldn’t be 
further from the truth! But that’s on you guys to believe what you want I 
know the truth so does ALLAH.274 
Left with this single item of alleged commentary on their actions, as well as their 
refusal to disclose information to the authorities when interviewed, it does not appear that 
the immediate mindset upon their return was remorse for leaving their homes and 
deceiving their families. Whatever radicalization occurred within the girls, taking them 
from radical Muslim to an IS recruit, seems to persist beyond the spontaneous act of 
traveling, and/or the intervention of loved ones and families. This is not atypical, as we 
witnessed with Alex, and even when prevented by outside forces from completing their 
recruitment, the draw to IS often lingers. Again, the inference here is that the process of 
recruitment speaks to a much deeper psychological need. 
This chapter examined six cases of women who were recruited or near-recruited 
by IS. The presumption prior to examining these cases was that the radicalization and 
recruitment of women by IS was affected by Brand Caliphate’s targeted messaging 
toward women. However, examination of the cases failed to determine any exposure to 
the targeted messaging toward women. Instead, the influence of the larger Brand 
Caliphate was prominent. An examination of these findings, conclusions, and possible 
implication for U.S. government policy follows in the next chapter. 
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This thesis intended to make two determinations. The first is whether or not there 
is targeted messaging toward women contained within the propaganda disseminated by 
IS through their marketing machine Brand Caliphate. The second is to determine that if 
this targeted messaging toward women does exist, is it a factor in the radicalization and 
recruitment of women to IS? 
Through the textual analysis of Brand Caliphate’s messaging in using the 10 step 
model offered by O’Donnell and Jowett, a reasonable determination can be made that 
there is a concentrated effort by IS to develop propaganda with the intent of targeting 
potential female recruits. However, in the six case examples that followed, no evidence 
could be found that these females were affected by, or even exposed to, the specific 
targeted messaging. This conclusion is limited to the constraints of the available open-
source material for the women in the case studies. The possibility exists that the women 
did have exposure to or were influenced by the targeted messaging and it went 
unreported. There is, however, evidence that the women in these case examples are 
responding to Brand Caliphate propaganda and the larger marketing effort by IS, but not 
specifically toward the targeted messaging toward women. These case examples are 
obviously a very small sampling of the women who have been radicalized by IS. The 
cases were chosen due to the availability of information regarding their online activities 
or exposure. To now apply the 10 step model to each specific case example would require 
additional detailed information regarding exactly what online material each individual 
was exposed to or sought out. Due to the sensitivity and taboo nature of aligning with the 
IS, this information is simply not available. This may be due to a number of reasons. The 
females in the examples may have used covert, alias accounts or encrypted 
communications to hide their online activities. In some instances, such as Hoda Muthana 
and Aqsa Mahmood, the women were successfully recruited and cannot be relied upon 
for accurate self-reporting. In the case of Alex in Washington State, her online 
communications were documented on her electronic devices. However, even this 
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information is lacking, as much of her communication was conducted via video chats, 
and we must rely on her reporting, which may be biased due to the nature of the 
communication and the potential for embarrassment and scrutiny. 
Although we can say that Brand Caliphate’s targeted messaging toward women 
does not appear to affect the radicalization of these females, that does not discount the 
larger role of Brand Caliphate in the process. Each of the women who were examined 
initially sought information about IS through online channels. Many of them were 
ultimately recruited through personal interactions by other IS supporters or recruiters, 
making the actual process more about the interpersonal, social interaction online versus 
the marketing. However, the role of marketing and Brand Caliphate remains key in 
developing the initial interest in IS and the female’s online probing for information, 
which ultimately leads to their identification for possible development and recruitment. 
The outcome of the analysis in this thesis resulted in one additional key finding. 
Although targeted messaging does not appear to play a significant factor in the 
radicalization of women, one overarching theme has emerged—the overall role of 
discourse in the radicalization process. From the more obvious impact of the broader 
messaging of Brand Caliphate to the revamped counter-narrative of the U.S. 
government—the distinguishing characteristics of who plays the role of the propagandist 
and what medium he or she uses appears to have little impact. In fact, although beyond 
the scope of this thesis, the implication is that this messaging already exists, often 
unintentionally, within the systems the potential recruit regularly interacts. This extends 
beyond the internet; to family, community, and even government discourse. This 
naturally occurring messaging appears to have set the tone for the potential recruit, 
helping shape his or her receptiveness to the more intentional propaganda. Consequently, 
any strategy to counter the effects of Brand Caliphate on the recruitment of women (or 
men) must include a much broader strategy to address this messaging found within the 
social and family systems of the potential recruit. To be successful, the battle over 




1. Tracking the Trend 
In December 2015, George Washington University’s program on extremism 
released their report ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, in which they examined 
IS recruitment in the U.S. and the role of social media in that process.275 The report 
identifies IS recruitment in the United States as “unprecedented,” with the profiles and 
motivations of recruits “diverse” and defying easy analysis.276 The report highlights the 
role of social media in the radicalization of sympathizers, identifying approximately 300 
U.S.-based individuals who were active on social media, engaged in disseminating 
propaganda, and engaged in “interacting with like-minded individuals.”277 The report 
details a trend of increased radicalization in the United States, asserting there has been a 
“recent surge” in recruits. The report further discusses a finding that echoes the results of 
this analysis: 
The role of social media in recent developments in the jihadist scene in 
America, as elsewhere, is central. Yet, it would be incorrect to 
overemphasize the impact of social media by considering it the sole 
medium of radicalization and mobilization for American ISIS supporters. 
A close examination of the individuals…reveals a significantly more 
nuanced reality in which the importance of social media, while present in 
virtually all cases, differs substantially from case to case. To be sure, cases 
of web-driven, individual radicalization have increased in frequency with 
the rise of ISIS.278 
A dissenting, emerging argument indicates the Brand Caliphate machine has 
slowed since the end of 2015. The not-for-profit Middle East Research Institute 
(MEMRI) has argued the trend has shifted: 
The Group (IS) has repeatedly stressed that “half of jihad is media” to 
highlight how vital its online activists are in winning hearts and minds in 
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cyber space…Female ISIS members took on multiple roles as ISIS 
members, both online and in actuality…the women did their part by 
waging psychological warfare against their enemies, and by participating 
in promoting ISIS online…Women were actively involved in penning 
threats on their various social media accounts, and tried to instill fear in 
their opponents; they were an important cog in the ISIS propaganda 
machine.279 
They argue that this model has evolved since late 2015, with the role of the online 
supporter shifting from within the Caliphate to those supporting from abroad. MEMRI 
goes so far as to assert that the content has shifted as well, moving away from blatant, 
organized threats and hashtag campaigns to subtler branding, such as imbedding 
comments within Western news feeds.280 To be sure, MEMRI does not claim this to be a 
sign of IS weakening, instead they argue it is to be viewed as a conscious effort to show 
that “jihadi supporters are not an uncouth, uneducated bunch ill-informed about world 
affairs.”281 
This seems to be an oversimplification of the current IS media machine. Perhaps 
IS has begun to explore more sophisticated messaging and focus more on external 
supporters to do so; however, this is not a mutually exclusive situation, as they continue 
to produce videos and publications highlighting their brutality. IS continues the regular 
releases of their online magazine Dabiq and videos depicting assassinations are published 
on a nearly daily basis. On May 21, 2016, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 
released one of many audio recordings continuing to call for attacks against the United 
States and the West, advocating supporters to make the month of Ramadan “the month of 
conquest and jihad,” and advising them to “get prepared, be ready…to make it a month of 
calamity everywhere for non-believers.”282 Supporters of IS did not disappoint al-
Adnani. The Centre for Research and Globalization has labeled the 2016 Ramadan as 
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“the bloodiest Ramadan month in modern times.”283 To support their claim, the Centre 
detailed a list of 15 international attacks occurring between June 5 and July 5, 2016, 
resulting in 421 deaths and 729 wounded, most of which has been attributed to IS 
supporters.284 Included in the body count are the 49 victims of the Orlando, Florida, 
Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12, 2016, which was the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. 
history.285 
2. The Results 
Not known for their terrorism research, the magazine Marie Claire published a 
surprisingly insightful article titled, “The American Women of ISIS.”286 In the article, 
author Kate Storey asserts: 
ISIS is now pursuing a chilling new strategy: recruiting teenage girls 
online. It’s not a fluke—it’s because ISIS wants it that way. The group 
creates propaganda that specifically targets women, and sells them a 
different message from the one sold to men (though both are told it’s their 
religious obligation to join the Islamic State). Men are marketed the 
chance to prove their faith by joining the fight; women are marketed the 
idea of sisterhood and the opportunity to marry a jihadi fighter, thus 
supporting the cause by raising the next generation of militants.287 
Storey identifies a pattern of targeted messaging for women, but in her analysis 
she fails to acknowledge the surprising receptiveness women have shown to the male-
targeted propaganda. In none of the information developed from the textual analysis of IS 
propaganda, or through an evaluation of the case examples, does it appear that women 
were dissuaded by the more gruesome imagery and violence-based propaganda produced 
by IS. Instead, it appears (anecdotally) that either radicalized women have embraced the 
                                                 
283 Joachim Hagopian, “The Bloodiest Ramadan Month on Record: ISIS Linked to Multiple Terror 




285 Matt Vasilogambros, “Was Orlando the Deadliest Mass Shooting in U.S. History?,” Atlantic, June 
15, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/orlando-deadliest-mass-shooting/487058/. 
286 Storey, “The American Women of ISIS.” 
287 Ibid. 
 88 
violence as part of the cause or they have dismissed the violence as part of a 
“misinformation campaign” by the United States to discredit IS and dissuade recruitment. 
3. The Psychological Factor 
Getting to the root of why these women are susceptible to being radicalized is 
quickly becoming an industry for professional analysts and think tanks. Although theories 
vary, many come back to some sense of social injustice in their current environment and 
the perception of acceptance and belonging in their new group. During an interview with 
the Denver Post, Nader Hashemi, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the 
University of Denver, stressed this point, saying young recruits are discovered by 
“appealing to their emotional ties—their ethnic identity—and feelings of social justice,” 
and that these young individuals are “searching for an identity, a cause, something bigger 
than themselves.”288 This theme, the identification with and membership within a group, 
was mirrored throughout the cases examined in this thesis. The circumstances for each 
individual recruit varied, but all seemed to be drawn to a sense of belonging. The impact 
of this connection to the group cannot be understated. In every case, at a key decision-
making time for the potential recruit, the group membership held more influence than the 
female’s family, friends, and/or local religious community. 
Echoing this concept, Richard Barrett of the think tank The Soufan Group, 
explains, “The general picture provided by foreign fighters of their lives in Syria suggests 
camaraderie, good morale and purposeful activity, all mixed in with a sense of 
understated heroism, designed to attract their friends as well as to boost their own self-
esteem.”289 This was validated during the textual analysis of IS propaganda—from the 
Islamic State of Cats account attempting to display a softer side of IS to the Flames of 
War video, highlighting their proud jihadists fighting the unbelievers. 
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There is debate among experts regarding the process of radicalization. In 
Georgetown University professor Fathali Moghaddam’s article “The Staircase to 
Terrorism,”290 he describes the staircase as discussing the central proposition that  
terrorism can best be understood through a focus on the psychological 
interpretation of material conditions and the options seen to be available to 
overcome perceived injustices, particularly those in the procedures 
through which decisions are made.291 
Moghaddam details the staircase analogy as a series of floors, escalating gradually 
to full radicalization at the top of the staircase. He describes the ground floor as the 
“psychological interpretation of material conditions.” Moghaddam identifies the key 
characteristics of this level as a sense of perceived injustice mixed with feeling of shame 
and frustration. This is followed by the first floor, which is the “perceived options to fight 
unfair treatment.” The main components of the first floor involve “individuals’ perceived 
possibilities for personal mobility to improve their situation and their perceptions of 
procedural justice.”292 The second floor increases to a “displacement of aggression.” The 
third floor sees the potential recruit experiencing “moral engagement.” Moghaddam 
explains this stage as the recruits becoming “disengaged from morality as it is defined by 
government authorities (and often by the majority in society) and morally engaged in the 
way morality is constructed by the terrorist organization.”293 At the fourth floor, closing 
in on fully radicalized, the potential recruit experiences a “solidification of categorical 
thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization.” Finally, the staircase 
is complete, and the recruit reaches the fifth and final floor, “the Terrorist act and 
sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms.”294 
If we accept the Moghaddam’s staircase premise, then the opportunity for 
government intervention with regard to radicalization, and in this instance, specifically 
women, should be focused on the areas surrounding the ground floor and first level of the 
                                                 






staircase. It is at this point where the feelings of injustice and isolation appear to fester, 
leading to the potential recruits seeking for a sense of community and belonging. 
Not all scholars agree that the process of radicalization and recruitment is as fluid 
and linear as depicted in the staircase analogy. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Associate Professor Mohamed Hafez and his associate and NPS alumni Creighton 
Mullins developed an alternate theory of radicalization, introducing the concept of the 
radicalization puzzle.295 Hafez and Mullins explain the current environment 
The new generation of homegrown militants is ethnically diverse and 
technologically savvy, representing the successful diffusion of jihadism as 
a mobilizing ideology, but this diversity make it nearly impossible to offer 
a single paradigm that explains the universe of cases. Moreover, women 
are increasingly playing a role in Muslim radicalization, raising questions 
about the possibilities of gender-based variables that have not been 
previously considered when discussing a male-dominated phenomenon.296 
Continuing with their puzzle metaphor, Hafez and Mullins identify four factors 
that influence radicalization: ideologies (both religious and political), grievances (both 
collective and personal), the individual’s support structure and the environment that 
enables their recruitment, and interpersonal relationships and networks.297 Each of these 
factors represents a piece of the puzzle, unique to each individual. How they fit together 
and the image that emerges cannot be generalized and is not a “uniform and linear 
process” as suggested by Moghaddam’s staircase and similar metaphors. If we accept the 
puzzle metaphor as a foundation for policy exploitation, this provides more opportunities 
for government intervention and disruption along the radicalization process. Each piece 
of the puzzle allows for a possible point to influence the narrative and thereby alter the 
image that emerges as the pieces are put together.298 As we saw depicted in the case 
examples, for the women who were stopped from completing their recruitment, most of 
the intervention occurred within the individual’s support structure. For Alex and the 
Denver 3, family members intervened to derail their plans. In the case of Aqsa Mahmood 
                                                 





and Hoda Muthana, the realization by the social system that radicalization was occurring 
came too late. In the cases of Jaelyn Young and Shannon Conley, the intervention came 
from law enforcement, which was alerted due to their interaction with interpersonal 
networks—Young by her online activity and Conley by her odd behavior at the church. 
As New York Times reporter Poh Si Teng observed, “For stories on Islamic State 
recruitment and jihadist movements in general, it’s very important to suspend judgment 
to really get at the heart of what motivates people to do certain things.”299 
Offering a successful counter-narrative campaign that delegitimizes Brand 
Caliphate and removes the jihadi-cool vibe of their marketing strategy is an essential 
piece of any Unites States Government effort. Follow this with an effort to address the 
sub-text of isolation for potential recruits, and a sense of perceived injustice (particularly 
at the government level) may result in a significant reduction in the number of IS female 
recruits. Although beyond the scope of this project, the possibility exists that this same 
approach would also have a similar effect on the male recruitment numbers as well. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings highlight what has become a vicious cycle of recruitment. The 
propaganda develops the brand of the Caliphate. The messaging creates the rock star 
status, the jihadi cool of IS. It is largely this aura of trendiness that is the initial hook to a 
potential female recruit. The interest is piqued. Once the initial feelers are out there by 
the interested female, they are typically reeled in by the online interpersonal interactions 
with IS recruiters. Once the individual is successfully recruited, the radicalization is 
heralded on social media by IS and publicized by the international press, ultimately 
highlighting the effective recruitment. Thus, the act of having recruited, in particular a 
female, becomes part of the IS narrative, feeding back into the propaganda loop to serve 
as a draw to the next potential recruit. This paradigm may not be unique to the 
radicalization of women. Although outside the scope of this thesis, it is entirely possible, 
if not likely, that a similar feedback loop exists for males inspired to conduct localized 
acts of terror in support of IS. IS-inspired attacks receive a high level of media attention 
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and the individuals responsible for the attack are praised and marketed by Brand 
Caliphate. Potential male recruits may be influenced by this propaganda to conduct an 
act, knowing they will obtain absolution of their sins, paradise, and fame. This act can 
then, similarly, be used by IS in their propaganda to influence the next potential recruit, 
again highlighting a feedback cycle. 
Any successful U.S. government counter-terrorism strategy must include a viable 
plan to interrupt this feedback loop. There appears to be two areas in which this can 
occur. The first is controlling the narrative. The Department of State has made strides in 
the area, but U.S. government efforts remain insufficient to date. Controlling the narrative 
will disrupt Brand Caliphate and diminish the initial interest or draw to the group. The 
second place to interrupt the feedback cycle is preventing the successful completion of 
the recruitment. Much like Alex, the lonely Sunday school teacher, intervention 
prevented her radicalization. Consequently, IS cannot market her conversion and use her 
to lure another young, isolated and disenfranchised female. 
1. Controlling the Narrative 
The successful establishment of Brand Caliphate has resulted in a type of 
trendiness for jihad and IS. Katrin Bennhold of the New York Times documents the 
phenomena of jihadi cool: 
Teenage rebellion is expressed through a radical religiosity that questions 
everything around them. In this world, the counterculture is conservative. 
Islam is punk rock. The head scarf is liberating. Beards are sexy…The 
Islamic State is making a determined play for these girls, tailoring its siren 
calls to their vulnerabilities, frustrations and dreams, and filling a void the 
West has so far failed to address.300 
Bennhold is correct. If the rock star status is the initial draw for potential recruits, 
then more energy should be focused on changing the narrative and the public perception 
of IS. By controlling the narrative and effectively removing the “cool kid” status from IS, 
it seems likely one consequence would be a reduction in the number of female recruits. 
With an effective counter-narrative that delegitimizes IS and removes the coolness factor, 
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it is reasonable to expect that recruitment would decline. The initial draw to connect with 
Brand Caliphate would be lost. Without the initial probing online, opportunities for the 
social interactions with IS recruiters would not exist. The waterfall effect would likely 
result in reduced numbers of recruits, including females. This pivot on U.S. policy for IS 
counter-narrative strategies may have already occurred. As previously discussed, the 
Associated Press has reported a significant reduction in IS-linked Twitter accounts, a 
trend attributed to a more effective approach to controlling the narrative by the U.S. 
government.301 Even if U.S. government efforts are primarily focused on Twitter, the 
saturation of the messaging goes beyond the singular social media medium. Much as 
Brand Caliphate benefits from and cultivates the generalized, rock star perception of IS, 
the U.S. government is finally using similar tactics and resources to delegitimize IS. 
2. An Inclusive Community 
Another policy implication can be found in the one commonality found among 
most female recruits—a sense of community. A consistent theme emerged from the case 
examples of female IS recruits. They were seeking a sense of community, or belonging, 
they claimed to be lacking in their home environment. How that community was defined 
varied from woman to woman, including feelings of isolation from their families, 
schools, friends, neighborhoods, or government. They lacked a sense of acceptance and 
belonging they felt IS could provide. Addressing this underlying sub-text could provide 
another opportunity for policy makers to influence the radicalization trend. Although 
outside of the scope of this thesis, the implementation of a community-policing model 
could be an effective mechanism to address the subtext and increase a sense of 
community.302 By developing a robust community-policing model, communities may be 
better able to maintain a sense of acceptance and unity within, dissuading potential 
recruits’ need to explore for an alternate community. 
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